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“AN OUTRAGE UPON OUR FEELINGS”: 
THE ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN RESISTANCE 
MOVEMENTS 
Daniel Farbman† 
After the election of 2016, many who opposed President Trump and his policies 
argued that local governments and local power would be the best tools to resist those 
policies and strengthen democracy. Among the most prominent acts of local 
resistance in the last decade have been resolutions that declare a town or a city a 
“Sanctuary” and refuse to cooperate with federal authorities in the deportation of 
undocumented immigrants. This Article situates these resolutions in a long tradition 
of local opposition to state and federal laws that towns and cities deem unjust by 
examining local opposition to the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850. Drawing on original 
archival research, this Article exposes striking similarities between contemporary 
tactics of local resistance and the tactics of local governments in 1850–1851 that 
passed formal resolutions opposing the Fugitive Slave Law. This examination of how 
local governments responded to the Fugitive Slave Law poses two broad questions: 
what did local governments think they were doing when they passed these 
resolutions? And how much power did local governments really have to achieve 
those goals? The answers to these questions are complex and context specific. The 
local struggles that resulted in these resolutions were part of an ongoing political 
struggle against the seemingly intractable problem of slavery. The local resistance 
chronicled here is exceptional neither in its heroism nor its effectiveness. Rather it is 
striking in its familiar messiness and ambition. In some cases, towns seemed to have 
modest expressive goals that could be met by their resolutions. In other cases, the 
towns’ resolutions seem to suggest a much broader set of substantive goals that were 
beyond the power or capacity of the town to achieve. Examining these responses to 
the Fugitive Slave Law offers a new analytical perspective on local responses to the 
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deportation crisis. Examining what local governments think they are doing when 
they pass sanctuary ordinances and comparing that with what they are empowered 
or willing to do helps us think more clearly about how and by what means local 
governments can resist national policies and engage in broad political struggles. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the spring of 1851, the residents of Marshfield, Massachusetts 
met in their annual town meeting and passed a set of resolutions that 
were a stinging rebuke to their most famous neighbor: Daniel Webster. 
Webster had been a long-serving senator from Massachusetts and one 
of “the Triumvirate” of American statesmen who shaped the course of 
American politics in the decades leading up to the Civil War.1 For the 
better part of the first half of the nineteenth century, Webster had been 
a political hero at home in Marshfield and across the North. But by 
1850, he had become a villain across the increasingly anti-slavery North 
for his role in the “Great Compromise” of 1850—the centerpiece of 
which was the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850. Across the North, anti-
slavery activists gathered to revile and reject the new law as a craven 
capitulation to the slave power. Webster, as a primary architect of the 
compromise and one of its staunchest defenders from his post as 
Millard Fillmore’s Secretary of State, became one of the principal 
villains for these protestors. Writing in his journal, Ralph Waldo 
Emerson summed up the feelings of much of the anti-slavery North: 
“Liberty! Liberty! Pho! Let Mr. Webster for decency’s sake shut his lips 
once & forever on this word. The word liberty in the mouth of Mr. 
Webster sounds like the word love in the mouth of a courtezan [sic].”2 
Webster was not a passive target. As a vocal and prominent 
proponent of the compromise in general and of the Fugitive Slave Law 
in particular, Webster saw the protests against the law as dangerous to 
the public peace and as a potential threat to the fragile union.3 He also 
 
 1 The other two members of the Triumvirate were Henry Clay and John Calhoun. See 
generally MERRILL D. PETERSON, THE GREAT TRIUMVIRATE: WEBSTER, CLAY, AND CALHOUN 
(1987). 
 2 See Geoffrey R. Kirsch, “So Much a Piece of Nature”: Emerson, Webster, and the 
Transcendental Constitution, 91 NEW ENG. Q. 625, 639 (2018). Discovering that Emerson used 
the delightful expletive “Pho!” in his journals is a perfect example of the unexpected joys of 
scholarship. 
 3 Webster complained that: 
There is evidently, abroad, a spirit of disunion and disobedience to the laws 
which good men ought to meet, and to check if they can. Men are to be 
found who propose as their own rule of conduct, and recommend the same 
rule to others, ‘peaceable resistance to the laws’; that is to say, they propose 
to resist the laws of the land so far as they can do so consistently with their 
own personal safety. . . . A still more extravagant notion is sometimes 
advanced, which is, that individuals may judge of their rights and duties, 
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took them personally. Not only was Webster’s compromise condemned 
by his neighbors, but only weeks later the Mayor and Board of 
Aldermen of Boston voted to deny him access to the famous lectern at 
Faneuil Hall.4 Webster understood these protests as paroxysms of 
political mania aimed at his legacy—but he also sought to dismiss these 
rebukes as passing fancies soon to be overcome by the reasoned 
patriotism of good “union men.”5 
Webster’s new-found infamy was widespread, but it had special 
symbolic meaning when expressed in his hometown. The Marshfield 
town meeting convened in March of 1851 to do the town’s business. For 
a small New England town, the annual meetings were the site of nearly 
all vital governmental decisions. It was at town meeting that budgets 
were set, infrastructure projects were proposed and approved, 
committees were staffed, school governance was overseen, etc. Town 
meetings were serious, if often mundane, business. Decisions were 
more likely to be made about how the year’s crop of barley would be 
stored than how the town would engage in the national political 
questions of the day. There was, in other words, no reason or 
expectation that the Marshfield meeting should bring up the Fugitive 
Slave Law or Daniel Webster. Most town meetings across New England 
ignored these national political issues as irrelevant. 
But Marshfield’s citizens made a different choice. On March 3, 
1851, the town meeting voted overwhelmingly to declare publicly that 
the Fugitive Slave Law that Webster had endorsed was in violation of 
the Constitution and that it was “a disgrace to the civilization of the age, 
and clearly at variance with the whole spirit of the Christian faith.”6 
Following from this condemnation, the town resolved “that until we are 
prepared to repudiate the principles of Independence, & abjure all our 
 
under the Constitution and the laws, by some rule which, according to their 
ideas, is above both the Constitution and the laws. 
 Letter from Daniel Webster to B.F. Ayer (Nov. 16, 1850), in LETTERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER 442, 
442 (C. H. Van Tyne ed., 1902). 
 4 See There Is Quite an Excitement in Boston, MIDDLESEX FREEMAN (Concord, Mass.), Apr. 
18, 1851, at 2. 
 5 Seemingly referring directly to Marshfield’s resolutions, Webster wrote that “[f]olly and 
fanaticism may have their hour. They may not only affect the minds of individuals, but they may 
also seize on public bodies, of greater or less dignity.” Letter from Daniel Webster to George C. 
Smith and Others (Apr. 15, 1851), in 2 THE PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE OF DANIEL WEBSTER 
429, 430 (Fletcher Webster ed., 1857) (emphasis added). The body of greater dignity was probably 
Boston, where he had been denied permission to speak. But the body of lesser dignity might well 
have been Marshfield, where the town meeting’s resolutions had been passed only a month 
earlier. 
 6 1 LYSANDER SALMON RICHARDS, HISTORY OF MARSHFIELD 163 (1901). 
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ideas of Justice and humanity, of truth & duty, we can be under no 
voluntary obedience to this act.”7 Rejecting obedience to the act meant 
more than refusing to help enforce it, it meant that “our houses shall be 
open to welcome the hunted Fugitive as he passes our doors in his flight 
from the national bloodhounds, who are baying on his tract.”8 Even 
more than offering sanctuary, the citizens of Marshfield went on to send 
a message to all fugitives that they should resist the Fugitive Slave Law 
and the national imperative of recapture that it stood for with all means 
necessary—including violence.9 
Daniel Webster was an apostate to opponents of slavery because 
he had once been a political hero who had betrayed them in service of 
compromise. Stephen Douglas was not so interesting a villain. To most 
anti-slavery Northerners, the famous senator from Illinois was a 
straightforward political enemy. Before he barnstormed Illinois 
debating Abraham Lincoln, Douglas had been a consistent opponent of 
abolitionism and a defender (if a tepid one) of Southern slave interests. 
Even more than Webster, Douglas had been a primary architect of the 
Compromise of 1850. Thus, it was that in October of 1850, in the 
fevered aftermath of the law’s initial passage, the Chicago Common 
Council approved a set of resolutions attacking the new law and 
targeting Douglas by implication. By a vote of 9-2, the council passed a 
set of proposed resolutions that promised to resist the law because it 
was in blatant violation of the Constitution.10 The Council pilloried the 
legislators who voted for the law (and the men, like Douglas, who 
avoided the vote), ranking them “with the traitors Benedict Arnold and 
Judas Iscariot, who betrayed his Lord and master for thirty pieces of 
silver.”11 Because of the law’s fundamental cruelty and injustice, the 
 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. at 164. 
 9 See id. The town meeting commended fugitives to choose death over recapture: 
[W]e commend to every Fugitive from Slavery the glorious sentiment of 
Patrick Henry, ‘Give me Liberty, or give me death.’ Seizing upon this idea, 
let him use all the means which God will justify to protect his freedom; and 
if he shall perish in the struggle for his birth right, as his last sigh mingles 
with the common air, and goes out over the world, and up to heaven, a swift 
witness against the nation which so foully murders him, let him breath it to 
the wind that murmurs by him, and bequeath as an inspiring influence to 
the panting fugitive he leaves behind him. 
 10 See Charles W. Mann, The Chicago Common Council and the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, 
Address Before the Chicago Historical Society 70–71 (Jan. 29, 1903) (transcript available in the 
University of Illinois Library). 
 11 Id. at 70. 
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Council prohibited the police from “render[ing] any assistance for the 
arrest of fugitive slaves.”12 These proposed resolutions triggered weeks 
of heated political debate but a month later, in November, the Council 
stuck mostly to its guns and condemned the law as “revolting to our 
moral sense and an outrage upon our feelings of justice and 
humanity.”13 Having disapproved of the law so resolutely, the Council 
affirmed that Chicago would offer no assistance “in the arrest of 
fugitives from oppression.”14 
The stories of Marshfield and Chicago are two examples of the 
local resolutions at the heart of this Article. In the aftermath of the 
Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, citizens called meetings in public and in 
private condemning the law. Anti-slavery conventions were convened, 
diatribes were delivered, proclamations were proclaimed. Among this 
public outpouring of opposition were a small but significant number of 
local governments that chose to lend their official municipal voices to 
the opposition to the law. All but two of these local governments turn 
out to have been Massachusetts towns governed by the classic form of 
the New England Town Meeting.15  
The towns that spoke out in resistance were vastly outnumbered 
by those who did not. Even in communities where antislavery 
organizing was strong and abolitionism was popular, town meetings, 
boards of aldermen, city councils, and county commissioners remained 
silent on the question of the Fugitive Slave Law, preferring to focus on 
traditional local questions.16 Still other Northern towns and cities felt 
compelled to pass resolutions promising to assist the federal 
government in enforcing the law.17 
Given the choices before these towns and cities, the question posed 
by the stories of formalized resistance to the law is: why? What did the 
towns and cities who voted to condemn the Fugitive Slave Law hope to 
accomplish? This may seem like a simple question: the citizens of 
Marshfield and Chicago and other places like them disagreed with the 
 
 12 Id. at 71. 
 13 Id. at 85. 
 14 Id. 
 15 I have been unable to come up with a fully satisfying explanation for why I have found no 
equivalent resolutions from other places where the town meeting form of government was 
prevalent. Although abolitionism was somewhat less politically powerful in states like Maine, 
New Hampshire, and Vermont, there were many vocal opponents of slavery in those states. 
Despite this, I have not found any evidence of anything beyond subtle anti-slavery gestures in the 
other New England states where the town meeting was the dominant form of government. 
 16 See discussion infra, Sec. II.C.2. 
 17 See discussion infra, Sec. II.C.3. 
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law and so they voted to condemn it. But a deeper investigation reveals 
that the question touches on a two-pronged puzzle at the heart of the 
study of local power, past and present: what role can local governments 
play in resistance movements and struggles for social change? And what 
role should they play?18  
We take for granted that local governments have limited powers 
and indeed there are many things that the cities and towns discussed 
here were not empowered to do (e.g., outlaw slavery). But just focusing 
on limited power narrows the question of capacity too far. In the 1850s, 
as today, there are many things that local governments had the power 
to do that they would still understand as beyond their capacity. In 1850, 
for instance, the town of Marshfield could have ordered its militia to 
protect any alleged fugitives in the town. So too could it have expelled 
any town resident from town meeting for cooperating with the federal 
law. In the present, towns and cities could likewise order their police to 
stand between federal agents and the humans that they are seeking to 
deport. The choices not to flex the full extent of local authority are as 
much about pragmatism as they are about power. In the 1850s, every 
local government that acted understood their capacity to be limited by 
a suite of pragmatic concerns (political caution, limited enforcement 
power, etc.). The result was that no local government offered sanctuary 
to fugitives in any more robust form than a collective, non-binding, 
promise that its citizens would not cooperate with federal law. 
 
 18 As I discuss further below, the question of who is acting and how in the context of these 
local governments is more complicated than it might seem on the surface. Like any public 
enactment, these resolutions were the result of a political process embedded in compromise, 
contingency, and the specific structural background rules of the local jurisdiction. Thus, when I 
say that Marshfield sought to resist the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, I am conflating the town 
meeting’s enactment with something like a collective attitude of the town. Although I account 
for nuance as deeply as possible, I have chosen to accept this blunted idea of agency for two 
reasons. First, in many cases, the only evidence of the resolution in the archive is in the official 
records of the town. Even in those records it is difficult to trace the arguments and procedural 
maneuverings that led to the resolution, meaning that we are left with an imperfectly flattened 
picture of the political process that resulted in the resolution. Second, and more substantively, 
the central question in this Article is whether and how local governments can engage as public 
institutions with resistance movements. The structural and procedural details of local lawmaking 
differ hugely across jurisdictions, but that background variance drops away when you look at the 
official acts of those governments. To illustrate this consider: does it materially change our views 
of two comparable Sanctuary City ordinances to know that one was the product of a place like 
Somerville, Massachusetts with a “strong mayor” form of government (where the mayor is the 
dominant force in local politics) while the other was the product of a place like neighboring 
Cambridge, Massachusetts with a weak mayor and a strong city council (where the council is the 
dominant force)? 
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How much assistance local governments can offer structures the 
analysis of how much they should offer. Here the stories of the 
resolutions reveal, for the most part, that the local governments who 
passed resolutions opposing the Fugitive Slave Law did not give deep or 
systematic consideration to a careful balance of local power and 
pragmatism. All but one of the cities and towns that acted in resistance 
seemed to do so as an act of reactive rather than strategic resistance. 
They chose to speak up rather than to be silent. While there is power in 
expression and alignment, most of the resolutions read as unsure or 
unspecific about what role they hoped that expression would play in the 
context of a larger political struggle against slavery.  
The primary exception that stands out is the town of Acton, 
Massachusetts. There the members of the town meeting and the drafters 
of its resolution thought carefully about both the questions of what 
Acton could do and what it should do. The result of this public 
introspection was a resolution that sought to stake out a modest place 
for the town both within the struggle to protect alleged fugitives and 
within the struggle against slavery. That modest resolution sought to 
make space for civil resistance to the Fugitive Slave Law within the 
framework of town politics, but it did not seek to make the town itself 
the principal vector of that resistance. To the extent that there are 
lessons for the present to be drawn from the past, I argue that Acton is 
the place to look for them. 
The question of how local governments can and should participate 
in resistance movements is of obvious present concern. This kind of 
local action is evident today across the political spectrum.19 The most 
salient example—and the one that has cropped up most often in the last 
few years—is that of sanctuary cities for undocumented immigrants. 
I am not the first to note a parallel between the national political 
crisis triggered by the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 and the present 
political crisis over the detention, mistreatment, and deportation of 
immigrants.20 This comparison has usually been made at a high level of 
 
 19 For example, there is a vibrant movement among conservative local governments to 
declare towns and cities “Second Amendment Sanctuaries.” This means that these towns and 
cities formally oppose and threaten to nullify federal and state laws that they perceive as threats 
to their Second Amendment right to bear arms. See Jay Stooksberry, Colorado’s Growing Second 
Amendment Sanctuary Movement, REASON (May 23, 2019), https://reason.com/2019/05/23/
colorados-growing-second-amendment-sanctuary-movement [https://perma.cc/7J3L-39PF]. 
 20 In recent years, a number of articles have been published laying out similarities between 
the present regime of deportation and the Fugitive Slave Law. The articles range from scholarly, 
to journalistic, to think piece, to propaganda. See, e.g., Karla Mari McKanders, Immigration 
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generality that has failed to appreciate the texture and complexity of 
such a comparison.21 As such, we have missed both cautionary and 
inspirational tales lying in the archives. It is undoubtedly true that the 
collective outrage and resistance that our current deportation regime 
has sparked is reminiscent of the collective outrage and resistance that 
anti-slavery activists leveraged against federal efforts to return alleged 
fugitive slaves to slavery. Moreover, given the present moral consensus 
that slavery was a monstrous evil, drawing connections between slavery 
and deportation has obvious strategic political power.   
The problem with these flattened comparisons, however, is that the 
totalizing evil of our view of slavery makes it hard to see the complexity 
and texture of the real and rich historical comparisons. It is easy (and 
often productive) to grant hero-status to present-day resisters by 
casting the glow of comparison with abolitionists over their actions. But 
abolitionists, like present day anti-deportation activists, did not operate 
in a world of moral consensus. The struggles against slavery and the 
Fugitive Slave Law were not always as simple as good versus evil or 
freedom versus slavery. Rather, they were political struggles between 
conflicted community members operating within a polarized national 
political struggle. In other words, the struggle against slavery was a 
version of “normal” political struggle. Thus, while comparisons 
between past and present resistance can inspire present activists to 
 
Enforcement and the Fugitive Slave Acts: Exploring Their Similarities, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 921 
(2012); Harold Meyerson, There Are Echoes of the Fugitive Slave Act in Today’s Immigration 
Debate, THE AM. PROSPECT (Mar. 6, 2018), https://prospect.org/article/there-are-echoes-
fugitive-slave-act-today%E2%80%99s-immigration-debate [https://perma.cc/CUK7-XY4J]; 
Shikha Dalmia, How Today’s Pro-Immigrant Activists are Adopting the Tactics of Abolitionists, 
THE WEEK (Mar. 7, 2017), https://theweek.com/articles/676729/how-todays-proimmigrant-
activists-are-adopting-tactics-abolitionists [https://perma.cc/CUK7-XY4J]; Andrew Delbanco, 
The Long Struggle for America’s Soul, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
11/02/opinion/the-long-struggle-for-americas-soul.html [https://perma.cc/HB3G-TAT5]; Kate 
Masur, Commentary: Chicago’s Resistance to ICE Raids Recalls Northern States’ Response to the 
Fugitive Slave Act, CHI. TRIB. (July 15, 2019), https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/
commentary/ct-opinion-ice-raids-fugitive-slave-law-20190715-puz4oclc4nczxotfjvhxj5idjq-
story.html [https://perma.cc/C65K-LWYF]; Manisha Sinha, The New Fugitive Slave Laws, THE 
N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (July 17, 2019), https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2019/07/17/the-new-
fugitive-slave-laws [https://perma.cc/BE7P-3HTR]. 
 21 I do not mean to condemn all of these comparisons as flat. In many cases the comparisons 
are forthrightly tactical, while in others, they are helpfully specific on a particular axis. One 
example here is the way that Allan Colbern and S. Karthick Ramakrishnan use the comparison 
between the present and 1850 to highlight commonalities in the way that states and localities 
struggle to protect ideas of state and local citizenship. See ALLEN COLBERN & S. KARTHICK 
RAMAKRISHNAN, CITIZENSHIP REIMAGINED: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR STATE RIGHTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 137–140 (2021). 
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reach beyond the morass of normal politics, a more detailed set of 
comparisons may also be drawn to show the common difficulties 
endemic to that struggle. If these comparisons are less inspiring on their 
surface, they may actually promise a thicker and more productive 
connection between past and present resistance when considered 
closely. There is at least as much to be learned from the struggles against 
intractable politics in the past as there is to be learned from past 
heroism.  
This Article offers a focused comparison between past and present 
anchored in a specific form of local resistance. By excavating the stories 
of local governments that acted officially to resist the Fugitive Slave 
Law, this Article provides a vantage point from which to assess the 
actions of towns and cities in the present as they struggle to express their 
disapproval of federal law and their desire to protect undocumented 
immigrants living within or passing through their borders. As different 
as the balance of capacity and strategy is between past and present, the 
shape of the question is familiar enough to merit tracing. If the 
resolutions against the Fugitive Slave Law are often inspiring, they are 
also sometimes futile and even troubling. 
While I do not shy away from holding the past up to the present in 
the hope of seeing the present more clearly, I want to be clear about the 
shape and force of the comparison I am offering. The central 
comparison in the Article is not between slavery and deportation 
(interesting as that comparison may be). Rather, it is the comparison 
between local governments past and present struggling with the 
question of what role they can and should play in resistance 
movements—and specifically in resisting the force of an oppositional 
federal legal regime. It is in the crucible of the Fugitive Slave Law and 
mass deportation that the underlying questions of local governments’ 
purposes and powers arise.22  
 
 22 It is for this reason that I do not devote much effort to defending the comparison between 
the enforcement of the fugitive slave law and deportation. Such comparisons are interesting and 
frustrating. As my colleague Dan Kanstroom argues, “many procedural aspects of the Fugitive 
Slave Law were later to be adopted by the Congress and accepted by the Supreme Court as 
legitimate components of the deportation regime. Of course, the repugnant but consistent 
classification of fugitive slave cases as matters of property renders comparison with the 
deportation system difficult.” DAN KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION 83 (2007). Still, I do 
persist in my belief that it is a mistake to suggest that slavery was such a higher-order evil that it 
cannot be compared with any present injustice. Although many saw it as the moral horror that 
it was at the time, many others held divergent and conflicted political positions around it. It is 
not hard, in the present, to find examples of issues where some people hold absolute and clear 
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Part I offers a brief account of the historical and political backdrop 
for these local reactions. This backdrop has two important elements. 
First, to understand the resolutions in 1850 and 1851, it is necessary to 
understand something about the history of local governance in the 
United States. In particular it is necessary to place these resolutions 
within a longer tradition of local government resistance to state, federal, 
and even colonial law. The resolutions in opposition to the 1850 law 
were innovations in some ways, but they were also part of an ongoing 
tradition which continued through the 1850s, through the Civil War, 
and to today. Second, to understand the actions of these cities and 
towns, it is necessary to sketch out the political forces pushing, pulling, 
and straining the fabric of the United States’ legal order in the decades 
before the rupture of Civil War in 1861. While in no way a full history 
of slavery or of the struggle over fugitive slaves, Part I tells enough of 
the backstory of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 to make the resolutions’ 
resistance legible.  
Part II then compiles as complete a catalog as possible of the local 
responses across the North to the Fugitive Slave Law.23 Some of these 
resolutions have been discussed elsewhere, most have not. Upon 
analysis, these responses break down into four rough categories. The 
first category is my primary focus here. In that category are places like 
Marshfield, Chicago, and Acton where the town or city spoke clearly to 
condemn and nullify the law. In the second category are towns and 
cities where the city government offered tacit support to abolitionists 
and opponents of slavery who took measures to resist the law. The third 
category (and the least well-defined) includes all the towns and cities 
where the local government simply took no position on the law. Finally, 
the fourth category includes those Northern towns and cities that took 
affirmative steps to actively support the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 and 
offered local resources to aid in its enforcement. These four categories 
lay out a taxonomy of possible roles for local governments to play where 
the question of resisting a federal legal regime arises. Thinking about 
 
moral views and where others are more politically conflicted. It is difficult to see in the present 
what we will come to understand as anathema through the filter of history. This is no apology 
for slavery, but rather a charge against political complacency that can feed off of the thought, “at 
least it isn’t slavery.” 
 23 By “North” I mean broadly states where slavery was illegal in 1850. This is not to say that 
local government in the South was silent on the question of the Fugitive Slave Law or slavery 
more broadly. It was relatively common to see resolutions passed at the town, city, or county 
level opposing abolitionism and proclaiming the necessity of Northern comity. While these 
resolutions are interesting, they are not the primary subject of my study here. 
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the second, third, and fourth categories helps to cast light on my 
primary focus: the resolutions in the first category. 
Finally, Part III turns to the present to hash out some of the ways 
in which the history in Part II may help us understand the actions, 
intentions, and powers of local governments today responding to the 
deportation crisis in the United States today. Here I pose the twinned 
question of what role local governments can and should play in the 
struggle. Without drawing a direct line between past and present, I 
suggest that the history provides a new lens through which to 
understand the present complexity of the sanctuary movement. As was 
true in the 1850s, local governments today vary in how much power 
they feel they have to resist and how carefully they have considered the 
role of their actions within the broader framework of the struggle. For 
those inclined to be critical of portions of the mainstream sanctuary 
movement, there is undoubtedly ammunition in the past to be drawn 
upon. But my hope is that the turn to the present does more than raise 
questions about the effectiveness of local sanctuary ordinances. Rather, 
I hope that those questions may offer a historical prism for reflection 
that local governments may use not to withdraw from the struggle, but 
to more strategically engage and magnify it.  
In the face of moral outrage, a scream is better than silence. In the 
end, I conclude that it was better for a place like Marshfield to speak 
than to demur like so many of its neighboring towns. But even better 
than a scream for its own sake is conversation, solidarity, and strategy. 
The history and the shadows that it casts on the present suggest that 
there is space for local governments to take advantage of their public 
fora to do this constructive work. We are too saddled with the sense that 
all that we do in public spaces is futile or worse. This Article concludes 
with cautious optimism, drawn from the past through the present, that 
local governments can, in the right circumstances, be effective parts of 
resistance movements. 
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I.      THE SECTIONAL CRISIS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND THE PRELUDE TO 
1850 
A.      A Brief History of Local Government Resistance 
In the mythology of the New England town, independence from 
the grasp of state and federal control has always loomed large.24 Thomas 
Jefferson romanticized the power of the town to impose a brake on 
tyrannical centralization, proposing that the New England townships 
had “proved themselves the wisest invention ever devised by the wit of 
man for the perfect exercise of self-government, and for its 
preservation.”25 Building on Jefferson, Hannah Arendt argued that the 
virtue of robust local government was to push back against “degenerate” 
government—a tyranny of centralized power that squandered the 
collective spirit of participatory self-government and allowed for 
creeping political oppression.26 
Whether this mythology has its facts entirely straight, there is a 
long history of local governments, and especially New England town 
governments, enacting their mythologized role to resist federal and 
colonial laws that they understood to by oppressive. A summary of this 
tradition of resistance shows that the resolutions passed in 1850 and 
1851 were an extension of past practice. Saying this does not mean that 
these kinds of resolutions were frequent or conventional. For every 
example of a town meeting resolving to oppose the king, resolving to 
work to abolish slavery, or resolving to protect fugitive slaves, there are 
more examples of town meetings that chose to take no action on these 
controversial issues or even to resolve actively to support the king and 
to preserve slavery.  
 
 24 One of the most famous cheerleaders for the New England town, Alexis de Tocqueville, 
documented what he understood to be a fierce and sovereign independent spirit residing in the 
town body politic. “In everything that pertains to themselves alone, towns remain independent 
bodies. I do not believe that there is a single resident of New England who would grant the state 
government the right to intervene in matters of exclusively local interest.” ALEXIS DE 
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 73 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., Library of America 
2004) (1835). 
 25 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), at TEACHING AM. HIST. 
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/letter-to-samuel-kercheval 
[https://perma.cc/YQQ5-87KW]. 
 26 See HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 254 (Penguin Books 1990) (1963). 
FARBMAN.42.6.1 (Do Not Delete) 10/24/21  9:18 PM 
2110 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:6 
   
 
1.      Revolutionary Town Meetings 
Local agitation plays a large role in the story that is commonly told 
about the movement for American independence in the second half of 
the 18th Century.27 In one dominant story, it was the anti-monarchist 
(or anti-tax) agitation of New England towns that sparked the fuse of 
the conflict which resulted in the United States’ independence. 
Contested as this story may be, it had permeated deeply enough into the 
popular imagination that it had become part of the self-regarding 
mythology of New England’s role as the catalyst of independence.28 
This mythology had its roots in true events. In the decade leading 
up to the signing of the Declaration of Independence, local resistance to 
the empire was a prominent factor in the increasingly hostile 
relationship between the colonies and the Crown. In Massachusetts, 
opposition to British oppression commonly manifested at the level of 
the town. In 1767, the British government passed the Townshend Acts 
which levied new taxes on goods imported to the colonies such as paint, 
lead, paper, glass, and, most famously tea. In response to these taxes, 
town meetings in Boston and beyond resolved to boycott the taxed 
British goods. Seeing these boycotts as acts of hostility—and seeing the 
towns and their town meetings as forces of disorder and revolution—
the British sent troops and ships to occupy Boston in 1768. In 
anticipation of this occupation, the Boston town meeting convened and 
called for a “convention of towns” to gather in Boston to discuss 
whether or not to forcibly resist the British.29 While this convention did 
 
 27 No less august an authority than the Princeton Encyclopedia of American Political History 
summarizes that “the American Revolution itself [was] a result of town meetings in eastern New 
England.” Maurice Isserman, New England, in 2 THE PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN 
POLITICAL HISTORY 534 (2010). 
 28 Harvard Law Professor Joel Parker gave a speech in 1866 that was emblematic of this view, 
arguing that it was the towns that were “prepared for resistance, not only in sentiment, but in 
material. . . . Great Britain rightly judged that a portion of the country so organized was the most 
dangerous . . . . But for these towns, New England could not have been prompt to meet the crisis, 
and to assert the rights of the colonies by an armed resistance which made itself felt and respected 
from the very moment of the onset.” Joel Parker, The Origin, Organization, and Influence of the 
Towns of New England, in 9 PROCEEDINGS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY 62–63 
(1866–67). The romantic view of the town as the fount of American democracy enjoyed a 
renaissance during the Civil War and the early years of Reconstruction as Northerners saw the 
opportunity to remake the political order from the ground up. See generally Daniel Farbman, 
Reconstructing Local Government, 70 VAND. L. REV. 413 (2017). 
 29 See MERRILL JENSEN, THE FOUNDING OF A NATION: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 1763–1776, 291–96 (Oxford Univ. Press 1968). For a full and masterful recounting 
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not end up advocating for armed resistance to the British troops,30 many 
of the towns that participated in the convention passed individual 
resolutions condemning the actions of the imperial government and 
supporting the towns’ rights to resist those actions through the 
convention.31 
In the years between 1768 and 1774, tensions between the colonies 
and Britain ramped up through a series of now-mythologized clashes: 
the Boston Massacre, the Boston Tea Party, etc. As the conflict 
intensified, the British Parliament identified local government as a 
primary cause of the unrest in the colonies. It was for this reason that 
Parliament made suppressing local power a central part of it its strategy 
for staunching rebellion in 1774. That year, Parliament passed the 
“Coercion Acts” which American patriots renamed the “Intolerable 
Acts.”32 A linchpin in the plan of these enactments was the 
“Massachusetts Government Act” which forbade any town in 
Massachusetts from convening a town meeting without the express 
consent of the royal governor, and forbade the discussion of anything 
beyond the local business of the town at any such town meeting.33  
These restrictions on local power proved to be a flashpoint in 
colonial resistance to British rule. In town after town in Massachusetts, 
meetings convened to condemn the new laws. Having convened these 
meetings in violation of the law, many towns passed resolutions 
expressly declaring their intention to disregard and nullify that law. For 
example, a meeting in Pepperell resolved “that we have a just [and] 
lawful right to meet together, when and so often as we shall have 
occasion to cultivate harmony and transact our Town affairs and that 
we will hold, use, improve that privilege and never give it up or quit the 
 
of this episode, see Nikolas Bowie’s forthcoming study of the place of local power in the free 
assembly clause of the First Amendment. See Nikolas Bowie, The Constitutional Right of Self-
Government, 130 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3676811 
[https://perma.cc/A8MS-JR8H]. 
 30 See JENSEN, supra note 29, at 295. 
 31 See Richard D. Brown, The Massachusetts Convention of Towns, 1768, 26 WM. & MARY Q. 
94, 99 (1969). 
 32 See RAY RAPHAEL & MARIE RAPHAEL, THE SPIRIT OF ‘74: HOW THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION BEGAN 23–31 (2015). 
 33 See MICHAEL ZUCKERMAN, PEACEABLE KINGDOMS: NEW ENGLAND TOWNS IN THE 
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 248–49 (1970). Annual town meetings to elect public officials were 
allowed, but everything else had to go through the Crown. See Bowie, supra note 29, at 29. 
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usual practice of meeting together.”34 Similarly, a meeting of the towns 
on Martha’s Vineyard resolved “[t]hat Town-meetings ought to be held 
in this county as hath been Usual according to the Directions and Laws 
of this Province.”35 
The resistance to the laws went further than direct nullification. 
When the “Intolerable Acts” threatened the status quo of local control 
in Massachusetts, those towns themselves became bastions of 
resistance. Where previously the bulk of town business had been local, 
after 1774 towns increasingly devoted their attention at meetings to 
national (and revolutionary) affairs.36 The threat to town meetings, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, inspired many towns to hold more of them in 
open defiance of the governor and the imperial laws.37 
Whether or not this building spirit of local resistance was the “real” 
cause of the Revolutionary War, the events of 1774 reveal an important 
backstory for the resolutions of 1850–51. Many (though by no means 
all) local governments understood themselves to be defenders of the 
political rights of their citizens. Corollary to this, those towns 
understood themselves to have the political, legal, and moral authority 
to nullify a law that they understood to be oppressive. In the context of 
the Massachusetts Government Act, nullification consisted of the 
simple act of meeting.  
If the American Revolution was a resistance movement, it is worth 
asking what the towns could and should have done in furtherance of 
that movement. Michael Zuckerberg has argued persuasively that 
Massachusetts towns in the 18th century were primarily concerned with 
internal affairs and orderly and peaceable self-government.38 But a local 
focus should not be confused with a submissive attitude or 
powerlessness. The towns’ reactions in 1774 suggested that town 
residents understood the towns to be bastions of self-determination and 
that threats to that self-determination would be met with resistance and 
defiance. Moreover, the towns were willing to flex their powers to 
 
 34 Resolutions by the Inhabitants of the District of Pepperell, June 27, 1774, TOWN OF 
PEPPERELL, https://town.pepperell.ma.us/147/Revolutionary-War—-2 [https://perma.cc/27NU-
PD28]. The Pepperell meeting also resolved to boycott British goods in protest and violation of 
the other Coercive Acts. 
 35 RECORDS OF THE TOWN OF TISBURY, MASS. 208 (1903). 
 36 See ZUCKERMAN, supra note 33, at 249. 
 37 See id. at 250. While not a town meeting, a convention of towns in Middlesex County in 
Massachusetts concluded that the Massachusetts Government Act was a direct threat to the right 
of self-government and that it reduced colonial subjects to a “most abject state of vassallage [sic] 
and slavery.” See Bowie, supra note 29, at 33–34. 
 38 See id. at 220–25. 
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achieve that resistance. Their collective and concerted nullification was 
the explicit product of a broader statewide strategic initiative. 
The galvanizing effect of the towns’ nullification was both outward 
and inward facing. Outwardly, the towns’ resolutions communicated to 
other towns and to the British authorities their intent to defy the laws. 
This was local resistance as outward political expression, rooted in the 
belief that what a town meeting says should and can have an impact on 
policy and discourse beyond the town’s borders. Inwardly, simply by 
calling the meetings in defiance of the law’s prohibition, the towns’ 
citizens communicated to each other that they valued their allegiance to 
the town over their allegiance to the governor or the king. This local 
public expression reaffirmed the collective commitments underlying 
town governance.  
The fact that all it took for a town to nullify and resist in 1774 was 
to convene a town meeting threatens to obscure the full extent of local 
government power at their disposal. At the same time that these 
nullification meetings were being convened, towns were flexing their 
police power muscles to back their words with punishment. In the town 
of Medway, a 1773 town meeting ordinance condemned the purchase 
or consumption of tea subject to British taxation in the town. Anyone 
found buying or drinking such tea would “be viewed as enemies to the 
Country and will be treated with disrespect by this town.”39 This was no 
empty threat. The town ordered that licenses be withheld from 
innkeepers and sellers of “strong liquors” if they were found buying or 
drinking tea.40  
This law in Medway is an instructive reminder of how many tools 
of local power towns had and retained until the 1850s. Towns could 
back their acts of resistance with the strength of the power to issue 
licenses, regulate liquor, and approve roads and infrastructure. When 
Medway named tea drinkers enemies of the state, the town used its 
power to back that condemnation with consequences. We shall see that 
when Weymouth made a similar condemnation in 1850, the town chose 
not to back it with enforcement.  
 
 39 EPHRAIM ORCUTT LOWELL, THE HISTORY OF MEDWAY, MASS. 54 (1886). 
 40 Id. 
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2.      Local Governments Against Slavery 
There is another set of precedents that the towns in 1850–51 could 
also have been drawing on: the role of local governments in advocating 
for the abolition of slavery.  
During years before and immediately following the Declaration of 
Independence in 1776, a number of towns across New England 
convened town meetings in support of the abolition of slavery as part 
of the formation of the United States. In Massachusetts, town meetings 
in Worcester in 1765 and then in Boston in 1766 instructed the town 
delegates to agitate for state legislation abolishing slavery. Worcester’s 
town meeting instructed the town delegate to “use your influence to 
obtain a law to put an end to the unchristian and impolitic practice of 
making slaves of the human species.”41 Boston followed suit a year later, 
instructing its town representatives to the state legislature to advocate 
for “the total abolishing of slavery from among us; that you move for a 
law, to prohibit the importation and purchasing of slaves for the 
future.”42 Neither the resolution in Worcester nor the one in Boston, 
nor the other resolutions across the state in favor of gradual 
emancipation43 ended slavery in the towns themselves by force of 
municipal law.44 Rather, these resolutions were collective public 
expressions by the towns’ citizens of a broader desire that slavery should 
be abolished. 
 
 41 ALBERT ALONZO LOVELL, WORCESTER IN THE WAR OF REVOLUTION 18 (1876). 
 42 A REPORT OF THE RECORD COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF BOSTON, VOL. 16, 183 (1886). 
Ten months later, the town meeting seemed to vote for the “total abolishing of Slavery among 
us.” Id. at 200. 
 43 Other towns that framed such resolutions were: Salem, Sandwich, Medford, and Leicester. 
Leicester like Providence (below) resolved that any black child born after a fixed date would 
become free upon reaching a fixed age. See MARY STOUGHTON LOCKE, ANTI-SLAVERY IN 
AMERICA FROM THE INTRODUCTION OF SLAVES TO THE PROHIBITION OF THE SLAVE TRADE 
(1619–1808) 69 (1901). 
 44 Indeed, slavery persisted in Boston and across the state of Massachusetts at least until 1783, 
when the Quock Walker cases ostensibly abolished slavery across the state. Those cases arose in 
Worcester, emphasizing that seventeen years after the Worcester town meeting, slavery persisted 
in that town. See Elaine MacEacheren, Emancipation of Slavery in Massachusetts: A 
Reexamination 1770-1790, 55 J. OF NEGRO HIST. 289, 289 (1970). In Boston, there is evidence that 
slavery likely persisted even after the Walker cases. See id. at 294–95. See also PAUL FINKELMAN, 
AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY 41 (2000) (“Although some slaves 
were held in Massachusetts after the Quock Walker Cases, the 1790 census reported none in the 
state. By that date community pressure militated against anyone who admitted he owned a 
slave.”) 
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The resolutions in Massachusetts were likely inspired by the 
growing revolutionary spirit there. In 1765 James Otis, a leading patriot 
and important figure in Boston politics, published a pamphlet 
condemning slavery and arguing that the presence of slavery in 
American culture is corrosive to political liberty.45 As 1776 approached, 
this argument gained strength as advocates for revolution in the 
colonies started to see the dissonance between their own cries for liberty 
from oppression and the system of chattel slavery. In 1774, the town of 
Danbury, Connecticut resolved that “we cannot but think it a palpable 
absurdity, so loudly to complain of [British] attempts to enslave us, 
while we are actually enslaving others, and that we have great reason to 
apprehend the enslaving of Africans is one of the crying sins of our land, 
for which Heaven is now chastising us.”46 That same year, a town 
meeting in Providence, Rhode Island voted to emancipate six slaves 
owned by a man who had died intestate. More than freeing these slaves, 
the town meeting resolved:  
Whereas the inhabitants of America are engaged in the preservation 
of their rights and liberties; and as personal liberty is an essential part 
of the rights of mankind, the deputies of the town are directed to use 
their endeavors to obtain an act of the General Assembly, prohibiting 
the importation of negro slaves into this colony; and that all negroes 
born in the colony should be free, after attaining a certain age.47 
Unlike the responses to the Massachusetts Government Act in 
1774, these anti-slavery resolutions were not in specific response to any 
law casting a shadow over local power. Rather, these resolutions seem 
to have sprung from a moral anxiety manifesting within the town 
meeting. As towns gathered to discuss whether or not to resist the 
power of Britain, some found themselves forced to ask whether or not 
the practice of slavery could be sanctioned within the new moral 
framework of the impending revolution. Where towns experienced that 
dissonance strongly, they resolved to oppose slavery in rhetoric (if not 
in deed).  
Between the resolutions against the Massachusetts Government 
Act and the resolutions against slavery from the Revolutionary era, a 
clear tradition of local resistance to oppressive laws and local moral 
 
 45 See GARY B. NASH, THE UNKNOWN AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE UNRULY BIRTH OF 
DEMOCRACY AND THE STRUGGLE TO CREATE AMERICA 63 (2006). 
 46 Bernard C. Steiner, History of Slavery in Connecticut, in LABOR, SLAVERY, AND SELF-
GOVERNMENT 400 (Herbert B. Adams ed., 1893). 
 47 WILLIAM D. JOHNSTON, SLAVERY IN RHODE ISLAND, 1755-1776 23–24 (J. Franklin Jameson 
ed., 1894). 
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advocacy emerges. These are the strands that the local governments 
acting against the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 would pick up. Before 
skipping ahead this far, however, it bears noting that this tradition of 
local resistance was not as actively in use against slavery in the 
intervening years as one might expect. In fact, there is surprisingly little 
evidence that local governments were active agents either in protecting 
the personal liberty of fugitive slaves or in the various political 
movements opposing slavery. 
While Northern states actively legislated to protect alleged fugitive 
slaves against being returned to slavery without any due process (and to 
protect free blacks against kidnapping), these personal liberty laws were 
nearly universally state enactments. There is no evidence that local 
governments played any substantial role in the Northern effort to limit 
the recapture of fugitive slaves before 1850.48 
Another struggle that one might expect to see spawn town 
resolutions was the movement to abolish slavery in Washington, D.C. 
This struggle was built on a flood of petitions from groups of northern 
constituents that Northern lawmakers, most notably John Quincy 
Adams, sought to introduce in the Congress.49 These petitions were 
drafted and coordinated not by towns but rather by the separately 
organized Anti-Slavery Societies that were cropping up all across the 
North in the second half of the 1830s.50 These antislavery societies were 
non-governmental organizations which frequently included prominent 
town leaders and that occasionally met within town halls. Their 
resolutions were the collective words of private citizens, not the official 
enactment of any local government.51 While the Congressional Record 
 
 48 I will discuss Northern personal liberty laws further infra in Part II.B.1. I would hasten to 
add here that I cannot say with any certainty that there were no local enactments protecting 
personal liberty or supplementing state laws. Rather, I can say that my research has revealed 
none. Proving a negative, especially amidst an archive that is nearly impossible to search with 
any exhaustive certainty, is impossible. All I can say with some certainty is that there was no 
groundswell of local action ancillary to the personal liberty laws that was at all equivalent to the 
local resolutions around the Revolution or the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850. 
 49 See James M. McPherson, The Fight Against the Gag Rule: Joshua Leavitt and Antislavery 
Insurgency in the Whig Party, 1839–1842, 48 J. NEGRO HIST. 177, 177 (1963). 
 50 Id. 
 51 This distinction will be all the more important in response to the Fugitive Slave Law of 
1850 where many of those same anti-slavery societies would draft and pass resolutions 
condemning the law. It is my argument that these resolutions were categorically different from 
the official enactments of local governments undertaken by towns like Marshfield. 
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is replete with references to these private petitions,52 I have found only 
one instance where a local government passed any official enactment in 
support of the petition campaign.53 
 Alongside this predominant silence from local governments on 
anti-slavery concerns a number of local governments did speak up 
against abolitionism and racial justice. For example, in 1833 the town 
meeting in Canterbury, Connecticut convened and resolved to block 
Prudence Crandall from establishing a school for black girls.54 Just two 
years later, in 1835, a town meeting in Canaan, New Hampshire 
convened to reject and remove the Noyes Academy, another school 
designed for the education of black children.55 The story of Nantucket, 
a decade later is more equivocal. In 1845 the town meeting voted to 
prevent the integration of the island’s public schools. Just two years 
later, however, after a spirited public battle, the town meeting elected a 
slate of integrationist school committee members who acted to integrate 
the schools.56 
In some cases, local governments took it upon themselves to 
condemn abolition out of a perceived patriotic anxiety about the 
survival of the union. For example, in 1837, the town of Brighton, 
Massachusetts (later to be annexed by the city of Boston) passed a set of 
resolutions declaring “our abhorrence of any interference tending to 
affect in the least degree the interests of the Slaveholding States, or that 
 
 52 Many of the petitions were clearly the product of the American Anti-Slavery Society’s 
massive petition drive. See OWEN W. MUELDER, THEODORE DWIGHT WELD AND THE AMERICAN 
ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY 62–63 (2011). 
 53 This resolution came from Deerfield, Massachusetts in 1838. Deerfield’s resolutions were 
drafted to protect “the citizens of free states while passing through or sojourning in the slave 
states.” Among the resolutions deemed necessary to effectuate these protections was that 
“Congress is required without delay to [abolish slavery in the District of Columbia] equally by 
the principles of justice, benevolence and national faith, and a wise regard for the welfare, 
integrity and permanence of the union.” 2 GEORGE SHELDON, A HISTORY OF DEERFIELD, 
MASSACHUSETTS 822 (1896). 
 54 See More Barbarism!, LIBERATOR (Boston, Mass.), May 18, 1833, at 78. 
 55 See James Arvin, William Marden, & Sylvanus B. Morgan, Letter to the Editor, To the 
Editor of the Register and Observer, LIBERATOR (Boston, Mass.), Sept. 5, 1835, at 1. The 
resolutions at Canaan went beyond merely rejecting the school, they also condemned all 
abolitionists as “[a] combination of disorganizers, led on by an Englishman, sent to this country 
to sow seeds of discord and contention between North and South—may he be removed from this 
continent as suddenly as the ‘Noyes Academy’ has this day been removed from the control of the 
Abolitionists.” Colored School at Canaan, LIBERATOR (Boston, Mass.), Sept. 5, 1835, at 1. 
 56 See KYLE G. VOLK, MORAL MINORITIES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
122–25 (Oxford Univ. Press rev. ed. 2017). 
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may produce any excitement among the slaves, or that in any way or 
manner shall cause any alarm on the part of the owners of such slaves.”57 
Taken together, these examples from the first half of the nineteenth 
century are somewhat haphazard and equivocal. To the extent that 
there is a clear takeaway, it is that the tradition of local engagement with 
national politics and with slavery specifically had not gone entirely 
dormant, but that local enactments and local power did not occupy 
center stage in the growing political struggles over slavery. One obvious 
reason for this is that, for the most part, those struggles did not 
implicate local concerns in concrete ways. From the Massachusetts 
Government Act through the lead-up to the Revolution, local 
governments had understood themselves as bound to act where their 
moral and political autonomy was threatened by oppressive laws. 
Where local governments periodically acted in the intervening years, 
the same pattern of implication applied. When Deerfield’s citizens felt 
that their fundamental right to petition was threatened, they passed a 
resolution resisting the gag rule in favor of abolition in Washington, 
D.C. Conversely, when the citizens of Brighton perceived that the union 
and thus the town’s peace was at risk, the town meeting resolved to 
condemn abolitionists and reaffirm its support for protecting the 
property of slave owners.  
If towns and cities did not feel themselves immediately implicated 
by the national struggles over slavery and abolition before 1850, the 
Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 changed the story. Similar to the Coercive 
Acts, the new law brought the struggle over slavery into the backyards 
of Northerners and spurred a set of local responses as part of a broader 
national political upheaval. 
B.      The Problem of Fugitive Slaves and The Compromise of 1850 
Since the first days of the new nation, the problem of fugitive slaves 
was a flashpoint for political contestation between Southern states 
increasingly dependent on slave labor and Northern states where 
slavery was steadily being abolished. Much excellent recent work has 
been done describing the outlines of the role that slavery and the 
problem of fugitive slaves played in the growing sectional conflict that 
 
 57 Preamble and Resolutions, Adopted at a Town Meeting of the Inhabitants of Brighton, 
Legally Called for the Purpose, on the 24th of August, 1835, LIBERATOR (Boston, Mass.), July 28, 
1837, at 123 (emphasis in original). 
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would eventually grow into the Civil War.58 It is neither necessary nor 
possible in the context of this Article to rehearse the story here beyond 
the most basic of outlines. 
Beginning in the early nineteenth century, Northern states that had 
abolished slavery became increasingly uncomfortable with the rights 
asserted by Southerners over the reclamation of their allegedly fugitive 
slaves. Under the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793,59 Southerners understood 
themselves to be empowered to travel north and “reclaim” the human 
beings that they claimed as property without any recourse to legal 
process. In operation, Northerners began to see these “self-help” 
reclamations as kidnapping and accordingly passed a series of laws 
intended to guarantee due process to any alleged fugitive claimed by a 
Southern slaveholder. In turn, Southerners saw these “Personal Liberty 
Laws” as an existential threat to their property rights and thus to their 
status as equal citizens in the union.60 
As the anti-slavery political movement in the North grew between 
1830 and 1850, Northerners’ commitment to opposing the rendition of 
fugitive slaves transitioned from abstract to immediate politics. At the 
same time Southerners also magnified and personalized their own pro-
slavery politics. In 1842, these tensions reached the United States 
Supreme Court when the State of Pennsylvania sought to prosecute 
Edward Prigg for kidnapping and enslaving Margaret Morgan and her 
children. Prigg v. Pennsylvania was a hideous case on its facts.61 Morgan 
had been living as a free woman with her family in Pennsylvania when 
Prigg and his associates took her and her children to Maryland by 
deception and force and thereupon sold the entire family “down the 
 
 58 For just two examples of books published in the last few years covering this ground, see 
generally ANDREW DELBANCO, THE WAR BEFORE THE WAR: FUGITIVE SLAVES AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR AMERICA’S SOUL FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR (2018); R.J.M. 
BLACKETT, THE CAPTIVE’S QUEST FOR FREEDOM: FUGITIVE SLAVES, THE 1850 FUGITIVE SLAVE 
LAW, AND THE POLITICS OF SLAVERY (Randall Miller, Zoe Trodd & Robert E. Wright eds., 2018). 
 59 The Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 was passed five years after the ratification of the United 
States Constitution to effectuate the so-called “Fugitive Slave Clause” of the Constitution and 
provide a procedural framework for slave owners seeking to reclaim alleged fugitive slaves after 
they had escaped. For a more detailed description of the law and its provisions, see Daniel 
Farbman, Resistance Lawyering, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1877, 1891 (2019). See also DELBANCO, supra 
note 58, at 105–06. 
 60 See THOMAS D. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL: THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE NORTH 
1780–1861 59–71 (1974). 
 61 Jamal Greene said that “Prigg v. Pennsylvania could easily be called the worst Supreme 
Court decision ever issued. The human tragedy of the decision is breathtaking.” Jamal Greene, 
The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 428 (2011). It is hard to dispute this claim. 
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river” into slavery and away from home.62 Prigg has been discussed 
widely, and a full account of the case is beyond the scope of this Article. 
For my purposes it is important to note two baseline conclusions in 
Justice Story’s opinion for the Court. First, Story held that the Fugitive 
Slave Law of 1793 was a constitutional exercise of congressional power 
granted under the Fugitive Slave Clause of the Constitution.63 This 
meant not only that Congress had the authority to create a federal 
system for arresting and enslaving alleged fugitives, but that state laws 
(like Pennsylvania’s anti-kidnapping law) were preempted by that 
federal law. Even more importantly for the stories that follow was 
Story’s holding that while states were free to choose to assist federal 
authorities in apprehending fugitives, they were under no affirmative 
duty to do so.64 
Prigg thus set the terms for federal intervention in apprehending 
fugitive slaves both by authorizing federal action to enslave alleged 
fugitives and by giving states permission not to remain bystanders and 
not provide assistance. This very right of abstention would become an 
important part of what made the enforcement of the new law so 
offensive as local citizens watched federal officers and even the federal 
military march through their streets in service of Southern slave owners. 
The simmering sectional conflict that flared in Prigg was the 
backdrop for the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850. The so-called 
“Compromise of 1850” has been covered from nearly every angle by 
historians.65 Again, it is beyond the scope of this Article to tell a full 
 
 62 Morgan herself had a strong argument that she was free, and her children were almost 
certainly free as a matter of Pennsylvania law and not “fugitives from service” under the terms of 
the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793. For a thorough account of Prigg, see PAUL FINKELMAN, SUPREME 
INJUSTICE: SLAVERY IN THE NATION’S HIGHEST COURT 140 (2018). 
 63 See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 620–22 (1842). 
 64 See id. at 625. The fact that Justice Story had left room for states to refuse to cooperate with 
federal authorities was something that Chief Justice Taney complained about in his concurring 
opinion. See id. at 627–28 (Taney, C.J., concurring). It was also something that his son William 
would famously celebrate when arguing that his father’s opinion in Prigg should not tarnish his 
legacy. See R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD 
REPUBLIC 372 (G. Edward White ed., 2004). 
 65 For a microcosm of the range of views that have been covered, compare ROBERT V. REMINI, 
AT THE EDGE OF THE PRECIPICE: HENRY CLAY AND THE COMPROMISE THAT SAVED THE UNION 
(2010) (adopting, as the title suggests, the view that Clay, Douglas, Webster, and the moderates 
championing the compromise should be credited with saving the union), with Paul Finkelman, 
The Appeasement of 1850, in CONGRESS AND THE CRISIS OF THE 1850S 36 (Paul Finkelman & 
Donald R. Kennon eds., 2012) (arguing, again as the title suggests, that the compromise was, in 
fact, no compromise at all and that the North capitulated to Southern demands while receiving 
nothing in return). 
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history of the negotiations or results thereof. The broadest of outlines is 
this: In 1850 a group of moderates in Congress brokered a 
“compromise” that nominally resolved an interconnected morass of 
political stalemates that had arisen in the fraught interplay between 
slavery and western expansion. Along with the Fugitive Slave Law, 
California was admitted as a free state, the slave trade (but not slavery 
itself) was abolished in Washington, D.C., and the territories of New 
Mexico and Utah were established while giving each territory the 
freedom to adopt or ban slavery by vote under the doctrine of “popular 
sovereignty.”66 
Although the totality of these measures was sold as a compromise, 
many Northerners felt as though they had gained little and lost much in 
the bargain.67 They felt this in large part because the linchpin of the 
bargain was a law which had sparked immediate and vigorous 
opposition: The Fugitive Slave Law of 1850.  
The Fugitive Slave Act infamously appeased the South by creating 
a brand-new federal infrastructure for processing and enforcing slave 
owners’ claims against alleged fugitives. This infrastructure included 
newly empowered federal marshals who were authorized to deputize 
civilians and arrest alleged fugitives without cooperation or approval 
from local police. It also required the appointment of federal 
commissioners who would preside over summary proceedings intended 
to approve the slave owners’ claims. These commissioners were 
appointed by federal judges but not themselves judicial officers under 
Article III of the Constitution. Nor were the hearings they presided over 
“trials” in any recognizable sense. The process was summary requiring 
very little evidence from alleged slave owners and making it 
prohibitively difficult for alleged fugitives to confront that evidence 
with evidence of their own. To see the bias baked into the system, one 
need look no further than the commissioners’ compensation. 
Commissioners were to be paid $5 in cases where they found an alleged 
 
 66 See Finkelman, supra note 65, at 49–56. Popular sovereignty asserted that states had the 
right to decide whether or not to allow slavery and that the Congress could not establish a 
territory on the condition that slavery not be allowed (which was the entire premise of the 
Missouri Compromise of 1820, dividing the American West between North and South/slave and 
free). It would come to be associated with Stephen Douglas and his support of the 
Kansas/Nebraska Act and opposition to the Free Soil policies of the Republican Party. See 
generally CHRISTOPHER CHILDERS, THE FAILURE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY: SLAVERY, 
MANIFEST DESTINY, AND THE RADICALIZATION OF SOUTHERN POLITICS (2012). 
 67 See Finkelman, supra note 65, at 60 (quoting William H. Seward’s view that “the 
compromise was ‘radically wrong and essentially vicious, involving the surrender of the exercise 
of judgment and conscience.’”). 
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fugitive to be free and $10 in cases where they returned her to slavery. 
Not only was the process summary, but it was exclusive—the law 
forbade the use of habeas petitions as a way to collaterally attack 
proceedings before the commissioners.68 
Northerners were outraged by this new federal regime because it 
subjected people that many of them saw as neighbors and citizens to a 
legal process that fell far short of due process before enslaving them. 
This meant that state courts and state constitutional protections were 
removed as obstacles. For Southerners, this was precisely the point. But 
for Northerners, this was an attack on their sovereignty and by 
extension, on democratic self-government. To make matters worse, the 
Fugitive Slave Law included new and stiffer punishments for any person 
who rescued or harbored an alleged fugitive. In doing so, the new law 
not only told local actors in the North that they could not protect the 
due process rights of their black neighbors, but also reached into the 
homes and churches of anti-slavery Northerners to criminalize their 
religious and humanitarian convictions.69 
Thus, as opposition to the new law exploded across the North,70 
much of the outrage was rooted not only in substantive opposition to 
the law but also in a sense that Northern political and moral autonomy 
was being subrogated to the protection and perpetuation of slavery. It 
was under these conditions and pressures that local governments began 
to ask whether and how they should respond to the new law. The lessons 
of 1774 and common sense suggest that the more a local government 
perceived a threat to local autonomy, the more likely that government 
would be to act to condemn the law.  
II.      LOCAL RESPONSES TO THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW OF 1850 
After the Fugitive Slave Law was passed in the fall of 1850, towns 
and cities across the North engaged the machinery of their local 
governments to respond to the law. The most striking of these responses 
 
 68 This description essentially restates a longer description of the law from a previous article 
of mine. That description, in turn, is nothing more than a synthesis of a much larger body of 
scholarly work. See Farbman, supra note 59, at 1889–95. 
 69 See id. It is worth noting that these punitive provisions were not brand new. The Fugitive 
Slave Law of 1793 also included punishments for providing aid and comfort to fugitives. See id. 
Still, in the new political context and combined with the newly empowered federal enforcement 
mechanism, these punishments seemed all the more invasive to an increasingly anti-slavery 
Northern population. 
 70 See BLACKETT, supra note 58, at 16–18. 
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came from places like Chicago and Marshfield, where the municipal 
governments passed clear resolutions condemning the law and 
promising to resist it. Many more towns and cities took subtler steps to 
express opposition to the Fugitive Slave Law and solidarity with the 
growing momentum of Northern anti-slavery politics. More common 
than either of these responses were the towns and cities that chose 
silence over engagement with the question. Finally, a few towns and 
cities in the North chose to weigh in on support of the Fugitive Slave 
Law, either as a result of national pressure, or simply as a reflection of 
local support for the South and compromise and local opposition to 
abolitionism. 
Although I am interested in all four types of response, it is the first 
category that is my primary focus. The towns and cities that acted 
officially on their outrage staked out the boundaries of what a response 
to the Fugitive Slave Law might look like. The other local responses are 
defined by their distinction from these town actions. For example, only 
in the context of Marshfield’s town meeting’s action does Concord’s 
town meeting’s silence seem significant.  
A.      Defining Terms 
In order to understand the range of local government reactions to 
the Fugitive Slave Law, it is necessary to take a step back and consider 
what it meant to be a local government in 1850. The corollary (though 
no less broad) question is, how did local governments understand 
themselves in 1850? In practice, these two questions collapse into each 
other because then, as today, local governments are primary and active 
agents in defining the terms of their own public role. 
Without some baseline consideration of these questions, it is 
impossible to think clearly about what local governments could or 
should do to resist the Fugitive Slave Law. In towns and cities where 
local government was understood as a minimal and managerial 
institution, the question of resisting the law would simply not have been 
germane. By contrast, in towns and cities that defined themselves as 
active political communities engaged in discourses that stretched 
beyond their borders, it may not have seemed to be an option to remain 
neutral in the face of a pressing national political crisis.  
If these two approaches reveal themselves in retrospect, the 
granular stories of the resolutions themselves illustrate just how 
dynamic and contingent local self-definition was and remains in 
practice. The difference between, for example, Acton’s choice to speak 
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out against the Fugitive Slave Law and neighboring Concord’s choice 
not to likely came down to a complicated mixture of institutional 
culture, local relationships, and the idiosyncratic individual stories of 
citizen participants in the town meeting. The political energy that 
coalesced in the form of these resolutions was frequently ad hoc and it 
is difficult in most cases to tell a clear story of how and why they came 
to be. While a given resolution could have represented the product of 
long and concerted debate, it could also have simply been an 
afterthought or a passing political concession to a particularly 
loudmouthed abolitionist neighbor. 
All of these messy contingencies make it more difficult to reach 
sweeping conclusions about the intentions or political philosophy of 
towns or cities as unitary entities. Still, it would be a mistake to allow 
the messiness of local lawmaking to keep us from treating those 
resolutions as meaningful objects of analysis. In the first place, the 
description of local law making in the 1850s is no less chaotic or 
contingent than a description of local law making in the present. For 
anyone who has ever attended a planning commission, school board, or 
town council meeting, the power of local relationships, community 
culture, and individual personality will be entirely familiar. And yet the 
zoning variance, school funding decision, or even the sanctuary city 
policy that emerges from these processes are no less explicit as 
statements of local government law. This is the best reason to not get 
lost in the morass as we look back on the resolutions in response to the 
Fugitive Slave Law. Whatever the chaos of their provenance, they 
emerged as public enactments that thrust the towns and cities that 
adopted them into a unitary public position that changed the way that 
the town residents understood their town from the inside and the way 
that observers saw the town from the outside. 
This partially justifies the effort to understand what local 
governments could and should have done to resist the law by looking at 
their enactments alone. It is also true, however, that in most cases these 
public enactments exist in the archive without any record of the messy 
context of their passage. To this extent, the shape of the narrative and 
the lessons to be drawn from it are inescapably defined and constrained 
by what is and is not recoverable through archival research. In the 
research for this Article, I have scoured searchable online newspaper 
databases, scrolled through pages of microfilm, searched in antiquarian 
FARBMAN.42.6.1  (Do Not Delete) 10/24/21  9:18 PM 
2021] AN OUTRAGE UPON OUR FEELINGS 2125 
   
 
archives, and been in quite a few dusty town hall basements.71 In some 
cases, the archive reveals enough texture to understand some of the 
circumstances that led to the ultimate resolution.72 In most of the cases, 
however, all there is to build from is the language of the resolution itself. 
Even knowing that there must have been complex social, political, and 
personal stories behind this language, the resolutions themselves have 
much to tell us about the public projections of these towns and cities 
and how those projections engage with the question of what role local 
governments could or should play in resisting a hated federal law. 
B.      Local Resolutions of Resistance 
The Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 was signed into law by President 
Fillmore on September 18, 1850. Almost immediately, Northern 
opponents of the law began to convene to express outrage and resist the 
law. While community meetings were called as soon as September 19, 
the official machinery of local government responses engaged more 
slowly. Between October and January, a first wave of towns and cities 
met in special session to pass resolutions and ordinances condemning 
the law. Then, in the spring of 1851, a second wave of town meetings 
passed similar resolutions at their regularly scheduled town meetings.73 
During this window, I have found at least74 nine examples of local 
 
 71 Towns in Massachusetts and around New England have generally kept handwritten 
records of town meetings in large leather-bound books that usually live on dusty shelves in 
cluttered basements. 
 72 In Weymouth, for example, there were three resolutions: a first resolution condemning the 
law in 1850, a second resolution retracting that condemnation in 1851, and then, decades later, a 
third resolution retracting the retraction and reinstating the condemnation. These three data 
points and the common participation of Elias Richards allow for fairly robust speculation about 
what the shape of the political struggle in the town had been. See infra Section II.B.1.a. In Chicago, 
by contrast, much of the struggle over the city’s ordinance was reported on in the contemporary 
press. See infra Section II.B.1.b. 
 73 Traditionally, annual town meetings in New England were held in March and April. For 
towns that did not call meetings immediately after the law was passed, this would have been the 
first time for the town to officially respond to the law. 
 74 I have sought these resolutions in multiple ways. I have used the now-standard digital tools 
at my disposal: digitized newspaper archives and book and article databases. I have also chased 
down leads in the paper archives that languish in the basements of municipal libraries and town 
halls. From what I have found, I suspect that my list is not exhaustive. That said, I also do not 
believe that there is a huge trove of resolutions that I am missing. Because these resolutions were 
intended to be public, most of them were well reported in the press. More often than not, where 
there is one reference to a resolution in the press, there is more than one, as these reports would 
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resolutions passed repudiating the Fugitive Slave Law.75 Of these, seven 
were resolutions passed at town meetings while two were passed by 
elected city or town councils. Each of these resolutions shared a baseline 
argument: that the Fugitive Slave Law was unconstitutional and should 
be resisted. They differed, however, in what form that resistance should 
take.  
1.      Explicit Nullification 
The most strident local resolutions opposing the law sought to 
accomplish two primary goals. First, they condemned the Fugitive Slave 
Law completely, using the local government’s collective expressive 
power to call for the law to be repudiated, disobeyed, and nullified. 
These condemnations seemed expressly designed to convince other 
local governments to join in the condemnation and contribute to a 
broader political movement to overturn the law. More than just 
expressing outrage, however, these resolutions professed the 
substantive goal of nullifying the law within the town or city’s 
boundaries. For some of these towns, the rhetoric of nullification was 
focused on protecting alleged fugitives from being recaptured. For 
others, the rhetoric of nullification was more focused on protecting the 
white residents of the town from prosecution under the criminal 
provisions of the law.  
a.      Weymouth, Massachusetts 
The story of Weymouth’s response to the Fugitive Slave Law of 
1850 spanned three decades. It was an illustration of just how contested 
and complex local politics were and what the stakes of local resistance 
 
be syndicated regionally and even nationally. Still, there are enough of these resolutions that do 
not seem to be well-reported to suggest that there are towns (though less likely cities) where such 
resolutions were passed. In short, while I do not claim that these nine resolutions were the only 
such resolutions passed, it is unlikely that there are a large number of other resolutions out there 
as yet undiscovered. 
 75 In some instances, it has been difficult to determine whether or not an “official” local 
government action was taken. Sometimes this is because a news report merely mentions that a 
public meeting was held in a town hall without noting whether that meeting was official town 
business. See Fred Douglas and Abby Kelly Outdone, DAILY UNION (Washington, D.C.), Nov. 24, 
1850 (reporting on a meeting in Wilmington, Ohio). In other instances, news reports suggest an 
official resolution, but I have been unable to find the text of the resolution or confirm that the 
news reports were, indeed, accurate. See New Bedford, CHRISTIAN CITIZEN (Worcester, Mass.), 
Apr. 5, 1851 (reporting on an “official” town meeting in New Bedford that other records do not 
corroborate). 
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were both at the moment and in retrospect. Weymouth was the first 
town in Massachusetts to pass resolutions opposing the law in 
November of 1850. Just months later, in March of 1851, Weymouth’s 
town meeting reconsidered the November resolutions and had them 
expunged from the town records. Three decades later, long after the 
salience of the issue had passed, Weymouth voted to expunge the 1851 
expungement, thereby reinstating the 1850 resolutions and erasing their 
erasure. 
The details of this melodrama are revealing of the degree to which 
each of these resolutions was a product of contingent local 
circumstances. In Weymouth’s case, those idiosyncrasies are 
particularly well laid out in the archive. The battle over the resolutions 
was an extended political struggle waged at the town meeting between 
the leaders of the town’s abolitionist cohort and a more conservative 
establishment faction. More specifically, the battle was waged by a 
single leading abolitionist named Elias Richards for the support of his 
neighbors to make the town an agent in the movement that he and his 
allies had committed to.  
Weymouth was one of the largest towns on the South Shore of 
Massachusetts in 1850.76 Large as it was, like most of its neighboring 
towns, it was predominantly white. Only sixteen of its 5,369 residents 
were listed as free people of color. Like many other towns in the area, 
Weymouth was home to a cadre of abolitionists who had periodically 
made use of the town meeting’s infrastructure to speak out against 
slavery. In a town meeting called in November 1842, Elias Richards 
introduced a set of resolutions protesting the imprisonment of alleged 
fugitive slave George Latimer in Boston and condemning the decision 
of Judge Story on the Massachusetts Supreme Court sanctioning that 
imprisonment.77 The town meeting approved these resolutions, staking 
out a clear anti-slavery position.78 
 
 76 The 1850 census reported that at 5,369, Weymouth was the third largest town in Norfolk 
County behind the cities of Dorchester and Roxbury, which were soon to be annexed into Boston. 
In Plymouth County, the next county south on the South Shore, only Plymouth itself was larger, 
and then by only 600 residents. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF 1850: 
MASSACHUSETTS 52 (1850). 
 77 See Another Voice from Weymouth, LIBERATOR (Boston, Mass.), Nov. 18, 1842, at 183. 
Manisha Sinha reports that similar town meeting resolutions opposing Latimer’s imprisonment 
were also passed in Lynn, Salem, and Sherburne around the same time. See MANISHA SINHA, THE 
SLAVE’S CAUSE: A HISTORY OF ABOLITION 392 (2016). 
 78 The resolutions began by quoting the Declaration of Independence and asserting that 
Latimer was “a citizen of these United States . . . incarcerated within the walls of a loathsome 
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Richards was a cobbler and leatherworker in Weymouth who had 
been a leader of the local abolitionist movement since at least 1836.79 He 
seems to have been a prominent citizen of Weymouth, well known to 
his neighbors and politically active.80 On November 12 of 1850, 
Richards seized the opportunity presented by a town meeting that had 
been convened to finish the business of a November 11 meeting that 
had been called to nominate candidates for state representative.81 
Apparently the November 11 meeting had run long and the meeting 
had adjourned until November 12 to finish its business. The town 
records do not include information about attendance, but it is not hard 
to imagine that a meeting called to tie up loose ends, where no other 
local concerns would be subject to decision would be more sparsely 
attended than other regularly scheduled meetings.   
Whether it was premeditated or lucky, Richards seized on the 
opportunity presented by the short extra meeting to take the floor and 
propose a set of resolutions opposing the Fugitive Slave Law. The 
resolutions began not by making local policy or even by advocating to 
other towns or the state legislature. Rather, Richards’s resolutions began 
by speaking directly to a group that was highly unlikely ever to read 
them: enslaved people. The first resolution exhorted all enslaved people 
to avail themselves of their rights guaranteed by the Declaration of 
Independence. In fact, the exhortation was more command than 
invitation: “Resolved [t]hat all slaves owe it as a sacred duty to 
themselves[,] their posterity[, and] their God to escape from Slavery.”82 
In Richards’s view, it was a human duty to pursue and secure the 
“inherent [and] inalienable right to liberty and the pursuit of happiness” 
guaranteed by the Declaration of Independence.83  
 
prison . . . for no other crime than availing himself of the liberty and pursuit of happiness therein 
set forth.” Another Voice from Weymouth, supra note 77. 
 79 Richards is listed as the president of the Weymouth and Braintree chapter of the Anti-
Slavery Society in 1836. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY, AT 
ITS SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING xliii (1838). 
 80 Weak proof of Richards’s notoriety can be gleaned from his inclusion in a volume 
summarizing the genealogy of prominent Weymouth families. See 4 GEORGE WALTER 
CHAMBERLAIN, HISTORY OF WEYMOUTH MASSACHUSETTS, IN FOUR VOLUMES, 600 (1923). 
 81 It seems to have been common for Massachusetts towns to convene official town meetings 
to do the towns’ state and federal electoral business in November. While most of the towns’ local 
issues were discussed and decided in March or April, towns also played a role in the nomination 
and balloting process in broader elections and that role required meetings in November around 
election day. 
 82 Proceedings of the Weymouth Town Meeting of November 11, 1850, in RECORDS OF THE 
TOWN OF WEYMOUTH. 
 83 Id. 
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On the one hand, this kind of exhortation from a white Northern 
activist to enslaved black people strikes of high-handed paternalism. 
Indeed, it is inescapably paternalistic. It is unlikely that any person who 
had actually escaped from slavery would so cavalierly claim that other 
slaves had a moral duty to risk their lives and families on the slim chance 
of escape. This romanticized view of the nobility and moral duties of 
the suffering slave was not unique to Richards or Weymouth. Nor was 
the prospect that white political elites would be using oppressed subjects 
as pieces in a broader political struggle unique to Weymouth or even 
the past.84 
Still, beyond the privilege and paternalism, Richards’s exhortation 
served another important rhetorical purpose. By exhorting slaves to 
avail themselves of their fundamental human right to liberty, Richards 
proposed to put Weymouth on the record as recognizing and respecting 
slaves’ claims both to humanity and citizenship.85 By claiming civic and 
human kinship, the resolutions both justified themselves morally and 
made a subtle argument for why a local government might feel called to 
act. The plight of the fugitive slave touched every town in the North 
because the new law compelled every Northerner to be complicit in 
holding them enslaved. Richards’s resolution rejected that complicity, 
advocating that because no human should be enslaved, every slave 
should become a fugitive.86 
Having humanized fugitive slaves, albeit through a somewhat 
clumsy privileged paternalism, Richards’s second resolution targeted 
his fellow citizens. At Richards’s urging, Weymouth voted that “any 
man who officially or unofficially shall aid or abet the execution of the 
Fugitive Slave Law, is a deadly enemy to the virtue[,] peace[,and] 
 
 84 As I discuss more fully below and in in Part III, many of the local resolutions both in the 
1850s and today could be understood as, at least partially, political maneuverings of white elites 
around an explosive and racialized national political dispute. Protection for fugitive slaves and 
undocumented immigrants might well be one goal of elite local politicians, but especially in 
places were relatively few fugitive slaves or undocumented immigrants live, the very pledge of 
protection has a political meaning and importance that has nothing to do with the actual 
protection offered and everything to do with a salvo in a national political struggle. See infra Part 
III. 
 85 This is consistent with Richards’s rhetoric from the Latimer Resolutions in 1842. There the 
town approved his assertion that Latimer was “a citizen of these United States” and went even 
further, calling him “our oppressed brother.” Another Voice from Weymouth, supra note 77. 
 86 Lewis Cass, a leading moderate, understood this part of Weymouth’s resolution as a threat 
to the union and an “invitation to murder” because it would force the federal government to 
reject the fugitives’ claims to freedom with violence. See WILLARD CARL KLUNDER, LEWIS CASS 
AND THE POLITICS OF MODERATION 254 (1996). 
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security; and should be regarded [and] treated accordingly.”87 Note first 
that this resolution was targeted neither at the Fugitive Slave Law itself 
nor at legislators or activists seeking to resist the law. Rather, this 
resolution was a moral condemnation of any person who might respect, 
obey, or execute the law. And the condemnation was extreme, 
tarnishing any friend of the law as an enemy of the public. Still, stringent 
as this condemnation was, it did no more than put the weight of the 
town’s public voice behind a scolding. The town did not outline any 
criminal or civic punishment for enforcing the law, nor did it propose 
to exclude any of these “enemies of virtue, peace, and security” from 
their role in town governance.88 Richards’s resolution sought to 
condemn his neighbors, but it stopped short of employing any official 
government action to back that condemnation. 
Instead, the third resolution continued to condemn without 
consequence. It concluded (without argument) that the Fugitive Slave 
Law was “highly obnoxious to the people of this Town” because it was 
“unconstitutional” as well as “arbitrary, unjust, and cruel.”89 Just as 
moral outrage did not trigger consequences, neither did the fact that the 
law was “highly obnoxious.” Rather than command that the citizens of 
Weymouth protect fugitives and resist the law, the resolutions merely 
“trust that the Citizens of Weymouth will never . . . become 
bloodhounds for slaveholders and return the Fugitive; but will protect 
him, as they would protect their own citizens.”90 
This third resolution again emphasizes the common humanity and 
citizenship of the townspeople of Weymouth and fugitive slaves. It also 
contemplates and trusts that every citizen of Weymouth will nullify the 
law when given the chance. And yet it creates no binding governmental 
consequences to back its rhetoric. A resident of Weymouth who assists 
in the enforcement of the law may be a “deadly enemy” and a 
“bloodhound” but the official legal and enforcement machinery of the 
town government would be still.  
 
 87 See Proceedings of the Weymouth Town Meeting of Nov. 12, 1850, supra note 82. 
 88 There would have been nothing unusual about Weymouth or any other local government 
in 1850 imposing local civil or criminal regulations to keep the peace or to regulate public 
morality. Remember, for instance the example of Medway in 1773, where the town meeting 
refused licenses to anyone who bought or drank British tea. See LOWELL, supra note 39, at 54. For 
a more general depiction of the extent and power of local regulations during this period, see 
WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
AMERICA 21 (1996). 
 89 Proceedings of the Weymouth Town Meeting of Nov. 12, 1850, supra note 82. 
 90 Id. (emphasis added). 
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In place of enforcement, the only explicit actions taken by the town 
on these resolutions were to record the resolutions “on the town record” 
and to offer them for publication.91 Even these relatively weak actions 
seem not to have been carried out. I have found no record in 
contemporary newspapers that Weymouth’s resolutions were ever 
published—and they certainly would have been published in Garrison’s 
The Liberator had they been sent to him. Moreover, the resolutions 
survived in the town’s records for only four months before they were 
expunged by the vote of the town meeting in March 1851. 
Before turning to the expungement, however, I want to step back 
and ask what Weymouth’s November resolutions can tell us about the 
capacity and wisdom of local resistance. First, what did Weymouth 
think it was doing with these resolutions? One facile answer to this is 
that the townspeople assembled on November 12 were humoring their 
passionate neighbor Richards. Whatever the real possibility of this kind 
of personal politics at the local level, once the resolutions were voted on 
and approved, they spoke in the official voice of the town—one of the 
largest towns in the state. From this perspective, there are two accounts 
of what Weymouth was up to. On the one hand, because the town took 
no official action beyond recording the resolutions, one could argue 
that Weymouth thought only that it was making an “official” statement 
condemning the law, excoriating any who would enforce the law, and 
exhorting slaves to escape. In other words, despite the radical language 
suggesting nullification, Weymouth was doing nothing more than 
exercising the town’s right to public expression.  
Another view looks past the weakness of the actual enforcement 
and toward the rhetoric of the resolutions for a more substantive 
intention. The resolutions as adopted clearly called for nullification of 
and resistance to the Fugitive Slave Law. If anyone enforcing the law is 
an “enemy of [the] peace” it is hard to conclude anything else than that 
the resolutions are demanding that the law and its enforcement be 
explicitly resisted. Moreover, the resolutions seem to promise (again, 
without the town’s enforcement power) that any fugitive who finds 
themselves in Weymouth would be protected from capture and 
rendition. This view of the resolutions better comports with their 
radical rhetoric, though it leaves open the pregnant question of how 
either that nullification or protection would be delivered. 
If both of these intentions are plausible from the resolutions, it 
helps to ask who was the audience and who was helped and how? On 
 
 91 Id. 
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their face, the resolutions had three audiences: enslaved people, the 
white citizens of Weymouth, and the wider world. If we take the first 
resolution’s exhortation that enslaved people escape seriously, then it is 
at least possible that one hope for the resolutions would be that they 
would be published and disseminated for the attention of present or 
potential fugitive slave. This makes the third resolution’s promise of 
protection seem more than rhetorical. Is not Weymouth promising that 
any enslaved person who declares herself free might find sanctuary in 
the town? The trouble is that it stretches credibility to suggest that 
Richards or anyone else in Weymouth really thought that their 
resolutions would be disseminated throughout the plantations of the 
South.92 Rather, the order that the resolutions be recorded in the town 
records and sent to the press suggest a narrower audience: the people of 
Weymouth and people active in the political contestation in the North 
over slavery.  
This audience makes more sense given Weymouth’s implicit 
admission that it had very little capacity or willingness to provide robust 
protection to a person fleeing slavery. Reading Weymouth’s resolution 
carefully, no fugitive would or should conclude that she would be 
protected by anything more than backslapping public sentiment in 
Weymouth. The resolutions offer no mechanism for actually providing 
sanctuary to fugitives or for resisting the law. Richards had convinced 
his neighbors to agree that the Fugitive Slave Law was “obnoxious” and 
that complicity with slavery made a person an “enemy of virtue.” But 
he had only won a skirmish in a rhetorical war—there is no evidence or 
reason to believe that his victory had any impact on the life of any 
alleged fugitive or free black person. 
By concluding that the primary force and purpose of Weymouth’s 
November resolutions were rhetorical within the space of elite political 
contestation in Massachusetts, I do not mean to diminish either their 
power or their effect. The town of Weymouth was now on record 
condemning a law duly passed by the U.S. Congress and tarring any 
person complicit in enforcing that law as an enemy of the state. Many 
residents of Weymouth were clearly unhappy about this. In March of 
 
 92 Richards and his neighbors certainly knew of the extent to which Southern state 
governments and pro-slavery mobs had worked to keep abolitionist arguments out of Southern 
discourse. The most famous martyr to this struggle was abolitionist minister publisher Elijah 
Lovejoy was attacked by a mob and killed by an antiabolition mob in Indiana in 1837. See 
MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE,” 216–18 (2000). After 
Lovejoy’s murder, antiabolition suppression of speech became increasingly prevalent across the 
South—a fact that did not go unnoticed among Northern opponents of slavery. See id. at 260–
62. 
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1851, in advance of the primary and largest annual town meeting, a local 
lawyer named Edmund Thomas requested a place on the agenda “to see 
if the town will rescind and cause to be expunged” the November 
Resolutions.93 When the meeting convened on March 10, Thomas’s new 
resolution prevailed and the November record was “hereby expunged 
from the records of the town.”94 Richards did not go down without a 
fight. He immediately sought and failed to have the town reconsider its 
vote to expunge.95  
Edmund Thomas represented a faction in Weymouth for whom 
the November resolutions were a threat that needed to be expunged. If 
they had been taken by surprise on November 12, at the March meeting, 
Thomas’s faction had been able to organize and change the political 
dynamics at the March 10 meeting.96 But the vote to expunge was 
misleading. By voting to reject the resolutions, Thomas and his allies 
did more than return to a status quo silent neutrality, in practice they 
affirmatively condoned the Fugitive Slave Law and its adherents. They 
confirmed that the force and purpose of the resolutions had been as a 
salvo in an ongoing political struggle in Weymouth and across the 
North and they had wrested public control of the town’s meeting to 
reverse the force of that salvo.  
Nearly thirty years later, there was one final symbolic chapter of 
Weymouth’s story. In 1880, at the end of his life, Elias Richards had 
 
 93 Warrant for the Weymouth Town Meeting on March 10th, 1851, in RECORDS OF THE TOWN 
OF WEYMOUTH. The items to be discussed at town meeting are generally set out in advance of 
the meeting in a document called a “warrant.” Massachusetts law required that the warrant for 
every meeting be recorded as well as the proceedings of that meeting. See id. 
 94 Proceedings of the Weymouth Town Meeting on March 10th, 1851, in RECORDS OF THE 
TOWN OF WEYMOUTH. In practice, expungement meant that the town clerk would write over the 
older record in colored pen (in the archive, the pen color appears purple, but it may well have 
originally been red or blue). The original text is clearly visible, but the text in colored pen reads: 
“In town meeting March 10th 1851. Voted the resolves passed November 12th 1850 on the 
subject of Slavery and the fugitive slave law be expunged from the Record.” Id. Of course, because 
the 1851 resolutions were subsequently ALSO expunged in 1880, a similar halo of purple text 
hovers over the 1851 record as well. 
 95 After the entry describing the vote to expunge, the next entry in the record of the March 
meeting states that the meeting “[v]oted not to reconsider the above vote.” Id. 
 96 Votes in town meetings represent the will of the townspeople present, not the entire 
population of the town. Whether or not Thomas commanded a majority of the entire town, the 
vote in March indicates that he had been able to whip a majority of the voters in the meeting to 
his side. 
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remained a central figure in the public life of Weymouth.97 On March 1 
of 1880, Richards was the author of a new resolution at the Weymouth 
Town Meeting. This resolution expunged the 1851 resolution and 
reinstated the November 1850 resolution in the official records of the 
town.98 In 1880, thirty years after the first resolution and fifteen years 
after the end of the Civil War and emancipation, nothing was at stake 
for Richards beyond his old political battle for the soul of Weymouth. 
That rhetorical battle must have been important enough for Richards to 
return to it three decades later and put Weymouth on the right side of 
history.99 
The story of Weymouth’s resolutions is instructive. Stretched 
across thirty years, three sets of resolutions, and a double-negative 
expungement, Weymouth’s public enactments tell as full a story as 
possible about the dynamics of the background political struggle in the 
town. Because they were never published, it is unlikely that 
Weymouth’s resolutions were actually a model for other towns. Still, the 
other towns’ resolutions were sufficiently similar that Weymouth’s 
story lays out a scaffolding of common strategies and questions to build 
from. 
b.      Chicago, Illinois 
Chicago is, of course, not a Massachusetts town. Unlike every other 
local government that I discuss here, Chicago in 1850 was a small city 
run by a mayor and a city council. Despite their many differences, 
Chicago and Weymouth’s stories are ultimately parallel in many ways—
and reveal push and pull of local radicals against more moderate forces.   
Chicago was the first town or city in the country to speak out 
officially against the Fugitive Slave Law. The Chicago City Council’s 
 
 97 Richards had become a founding member of the Weymouth Historical Society and had 
been active in preserving town records and other documents in that role. See WEYMOUTH 
HISTORICAL SOCIETY, WEYMOUTH TOWN GOVERNMENT: ITS BEGINNINGS AND DEVELOPMENT 
34 (1941) (noting that “[t]he Weymouth Historical Society was organized in 1879, with Elias 
Richards, President.”). 
 98 See Proceedings of the Weymouth Town Meeting on March 1st, 1880, in RECORDS OF THE 
TOWN OF WEYMOUTH. 
 99 Richards’s resolution may have been something more than merely nostalgic. 1880 was a 
time when the fires of abolitionism and racial equality were briefly rekindled after the waning of 
Reconstruction. James Garfield was elected president in November of 1880, partly on a platform 
of pushing back against Southern impositions on the rights of freed blacks. See JAMES 
MCPHERSON, THE ABOLITIONIST LEGACY: FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NAACP 104–06 
(1995). It is at least plausible that Richards, himself a veteran political agitator, seized the moment 
in 1880 not only to settle an old score, but to help advance the new manifestation of the old cause 
as well. 
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first resolutions against the law were passed less than a month after the 
bill was signed on October 15, 1850. Chicago in 1850 was a rapidly 
growing city. According to the 1850 census, there were 29,963 people 
living in Chicago, 323 of them free black residents.100 In addition to 
those 323, it is likely that there were a significant number of uncounted 
black residents who evaded the census.101  
Unlike the Massachusetts towns, Chicago’s free black community 
was large and organized. Just days after the Fugitive Slave Law was 
signed by President Fillmore on September 30, more than three-
hundred abolitionists convened at Quinn Chapel A.M.E. Church on the 
South Side of the city.102 The meeting was led by leaders of the black 
abolitionist movement, and the resolutions passed were targeted 
explicitly at protecting black Chicagoans. The meeting resolved that “we 
must abandon the hope of any protection from government, and cannot 
rely upon protection from the people, [and] we are therefore left no 
alternative but a resort to self protection.”103 With this attitude, the 
meeting argued that “the tendency of the Fugitive Slave Bill . . . [was] to 
enslave every colored man in the United States.”104 To resist the bill, the 
meeting resolved to create a set of private “patrols,” each composed of 
six abolitionists who would keep watch for any sign of slave catchers in 
the city.105  
Strikingly, the Chicago meeting, like the Weymouth resolutions 
and the Marshfield resolutions exhorted slaves and fugitives to 
resistance and even violence if necessary. The participants in the 
meeting resolved to avoid violent resistance to the extent possible, but 
that when faced with the choice between liberty or death, the meeting 
 
 100 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF 1850: ILLINOIS (1850). By 1860, the population 
had exploded to 109,260, 955 of whom were free black citizens. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 
CENSUS OF 1860 90 (1860). 
 101 It is not hard to imagine why it might have been difficult for the census authorities to make 
an accurate count of fugitives from slavery for reasons that parallel the salient questions about 
the accuracy of the count of both documented and undocumented immigrants in the present. 
The problem was not unlike the problem of counting the “maroons” who had escaped into the 
swamps and wildernesses of the South. About this population, abolitionist Edmund Jackson 
remarked, “From the character of the population it is reasonable to infer that the United States 
Marshal has never charged himself with the duty of taking the census of the swamp.” SYLVIANE 
A. DIOUF, SLAVERY’S EXILES: THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN MAROONS 211 (2014). 
 102 See CHRISTOPHER ROBERT REED, BLACK CHICAGO’S FIRST CENTURY, 1833–1900 101 
(2005). 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. (bracketed alteration and ellipsis in original). 
 105 Id. 
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advised alleged fugitives to choose to die resisting.106 There is, of course, 
a marked distinction between a gathering of black abolitionists pledging 
to resist capture and kidnapping with their lives and predominantly 
white towns in Massachusetts exhorting black fugitives to do the same. 
This distinction ends up being crucially important when we think about 
who a local action is intended to help and who the audience for that 
action is. 
Although the meeting of activists had despaired of any help from 
the government, the City Council convened a meeting on October 21 to 
adopt resolutions in sympathy with the abolitionists and against the 
Fugitive Slave Law. Staunch abolitionist Alderman Amos Throop 
introduced a series of scorching resolutions condemning the Law. 
Throop, like Elias Richards in Weymouth, was a fervent and well-
known abolitionist.107 And, as with Richards, it was clear that the 
resolutions were part of a broader political project. 
As most of the other local resolutions would, the first two of these 
resolutions condemned the Fugitive Slave Law as in violation of the 
Constitution. Unlike Weymouth, Throop’s resolutions articulated a 
legal argument against the law consistent with broader abolitionist 
arguments: it unconstitutionally deprived alleged fugitives of the right 
of habeas corpus and a jury trial.108 In Throop’s formulation, he 
highlighted the injustice of the law by pointing out that in the language 
of the law, “not only fugitive slaves, but white men, owing to service to 
another in another State . . . may be captured and carried off summarily 
and without legal recourse of any kind.”109 There is no proof that the 
law was ever intended to be used that way or that it ever was, but Throop 
was likely trying to highlight the risk posed to everyone’s constitutional 
rights should anyone’s rights be constrained. Moreover, Throop’s effort 
to draw common threads of oppression was a cognate of Richards’s 
universalizing rhetoric in Weymouth. His argument, in simplified 
terms, was that enslaved people were human beings and that if the law 
could treat them this way, there was nothing to stop the law from 
 
 106 See id.; see also Mann, supra note 10, at 68. 
 107 Id. at 70–71. One further resolution was introduced by Alderman Sherwood which was 
also included in the vote. Id. at 71. Amos Throop was a leader in the anti-slavery political 
movement in the city. Pro-slavery mobs would later burn his likeness in effigy for his role 
opposing the Fugitive Slave Law and the Kansas Nebraska Act. See THE AMOS GAGER THROOP 
COLLECTION 8 (Shelley Erwin & Carol H. Bugé, eds., 1990). Later in life, Throop would emigrate 
to Pasadena and become a principal founder of the California Institute of Technology (originally 
called “Throop University”). Id. at 12–13. 
 108 See Mann, supra note 10, at 70. 
 109 Id. 
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oppressing white Chicagoans. Common humanity implied a common 
peril in oppressive legal regimes. 
The third and fourth resolutions hashed out the consequences of 
the Law’s unconstitutionality by advocating for nullification. “No law 
can be legally or morally binding on us which violates the provisions of 
the Constitution.”110 If legal argument were not sufficient, the fourth 
resolution held that “the laws of God” should trump “all human 
compacts and statutes.”111 Thus introduced, the Fugitive Slave Law of 
1850 was both in violation of the Constitution and in opposition to the 
commands of Christian morality. It followed from this, in the fifth 
resolution, that all of the politicians in Washington who voted for the 
law “richly merit the reproach of all lovers of freedom, and are only to 
be ranked with the traitors Benedict Arnold and Judas Iscariot.”112 
This was a powerful prelude to nullification and, it seemed, a 
response to the Quinn Chapel meeting pledging the kind of public 
support and protection that the activists had despaired of. And yet, 
Throop’s sixth resolution failed to realize this suggested promise. 
Throop did not pledge the police department’s help in protecting 
fugitives from slave catchers, nor did it threaten to withhold city 
services, condition licensing, or take any other affirmative action to 
prevent kidnappings or recapture. Rather, the resolution merely 
proclaimed that “the citizens, officers and police of this city” will 
“abstain from any and all interference in the capture and delivering up 
of the fugitives of unrighteous oppression.”113 
To this promise, Alderman Sherwood’s seventh resolution added 
that because the law was “cruel and unjust [it] ought not to be respected 
by an intelligent community.”114 As with the sixth resolution, this lack 
of respect was to be manifest only by the council declining to “require 
the police to render any assistance” to slave catchers.115 
Contrast the actual actions demanded by these resolutions with the 
actions that emerged from the meeting at Quinn Chapel weeks before. 
The abolitionist activists had pledged mutual aid and support to defend 
their community and created a patrol infrastructure to keep watch for 
and protect against slave catchers. For all the fiery rhetoric, Aldermen 
Throop and Sherwood promised nothing more than that the city would 
 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at 70–71. 
 114 Id. at 71. 
 115 Id. 
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take no steps to help slave owners recapture their slaves. This was 
nothing more than the law allowed under Prigg and a recommitment to 
the city’s status quo nonparticipation. At its most generous, it could be 
read as license to private actors to engage in protection. But even there, 
the city offered no protection to any Chicagoan who acted on their 
private initiative to protect alleged fugitives. 
Weak though the actual nullification was, as in Weymouth, the 
rhetoric was inflammatory enough to set off a local firestorm of 
pushback. The Council had voted 9-2 to provisionally approve these 
resolutions and put them forward for public discussion. A first public 
meeting on the question, held the next day, expressed overwhelming 
support for the resolutions and opposition to the Fugitive Slave Law.116 
But, perhaps not by accident, the famous and popular Illinois Senator 
who was a leading advocate for the Compromise of 1850, Stephen 
Douglas, was in town.117 Two days after the resolutions had passed, on 
Wednesday October 23, Douglas convened a rally against the 
resolutions and in support of the Union and the congressional 
compromise. Shrugging off the personal attacks in the resolutions (it 
was almost certainly Douglas that Throop was referring to when he 
mentioned Benedict Arnold and Judas), Douglas’s main argument was 
that the resolutions amounted to “naked, unmitigated nullification.”118 
Douglas argued that cities in general and Chicago in particular have no 
power to interpret nor nullify the Constitution. 
Whence did the Council derive their authority? I have been able to 
find no such provision in the city charter, nor am I aware that the 
Legislature of Illinois is vested with any rightful power to confer such 
authority. I have yet to learn that a subordinate municipal 
corporation is licensed to raise the standard of rebellion, and throw 
off the authority of the Federal Government at pleasure.119 
While he would go on to defend the Fugitive Slave Law as 
constitutionally and morally defensible, the most interesting part of 
Douglas’s challenge was his diagnosis of the city’s powerlessness. In the 
first instance, having seen how weak Throop’s nullification was in the 
first place, what did Douglas think amounted to “naked” nullification? 
 
 116 See id. at 71–73. 
 117 The record is equivocal on whether the City Council’s resolutions were timed to pass while 
Douglas was in town. So too is it unclear about whether Douglas had returned to town expressly 
for the purpose of quelling an abolitionist uprising. Id. at 73. 
 118 Id. at 75. 
 119 Id. 
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The new law placed towns and cities under no affirmative obligation to 
assist in the capture and rendition of alleged fugitives, and so when the 
Council promised not to command the police to cooperate, that 
promise was not in conflict with any federal legal command. Rather, the 
nullification seems to reside in the resolution that the Fugitive Slave 
Law was not worthy of respect or obedience because it was 
unconstitutional and unjust. For Douglas, then, a city’s official 
pronouncement declaring a law unjust posed some larger and more 
concrete risk than the declaration of a group of private citizens. 
Something about the “official” nature of the city’s enactment 
transformed rhetoric into naked nullification.120 
Douglas closed his speech with a slate of his own, competing, 
resolutions. These resolutions proclaimed the legality, legitimacy, and 
moral rectitude of the Fugitive Slave Law and declared that the safety 
and perpetuation of the union depended on its enforcement.121 For the 
next month, the city and the Council debated the issue. Senator Douglas 
was a popular figure and some Council members hoped to pass a 
resolution agreeing with him and expunging the October resolutions 
from the record. When the Council met again on November 29, they 
took up the issue again and they toned down their rhetoric without 
conceding. 
The Council voted by a margin of 11-3 to modify the October 
resolutions without entirely repudiating them. The Council substituted 
two new resolutions drafted by Alderman Dodge for those of Throop 
and Sherman.122 These new resolutions were no gentler than Throop’s 
had been in their condemnation of the Fugitive Slave Law. Dodge began 
by proclaiming that the law “is revolting to our moral sense and an 
outrage upon our feelings of justice and humanity.”123 Strong though 
this was, Dodge shied away from Throop’s direct language of 
nullification. Rather than proclaim that the law should not be obeyed, 
Dodge’s resolutions offered an argument about the nature of the harm 
caused by the law. The real evil of the law lay in its perversion of the 
Constitution, which has the “direct tendency . . . to alienate the people 
 
 120 Douglas’s response is consistent with Lewis Cass’s alarm at the Weymouth resolutions. 
Both reactions suggest that the mere rhetoric of nullification posed a threat almost as great as 
aggressive substantive nullification. 
 121 See MANN, supra note 10, at 79–80. 
 122 Id. at 85. 
 123 Id. 
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from their love and reverence for the government and institutions of 
our country.”124  
By shifting the register from nullification to democratic legitimacy, 
Dodge’s first resolution subtly rechanneled the “outrage upon our 
feelings” from a declaration of overt resistance to a more cautiously 
framed political objection. In this, Chicago shifted away from the 
nullifying localities like Weymouth and Marshfield toward towns like 
Acton and Needham (discussed below) whose objections were framed 
locally and whose prescriptions involved individual conscience and 
political persuasion more than overt resistance.  
Dodge’s second resolution did little more than elaborate on 
Throop and Sherman’s promise that Chicago would not help to enforce 
the law. Drawing on Prigg, the resolution concludes that the Supreme 
Court “has solemnly adjudged that State officers are under no 
obligations to fulfil duties imposed upon them as such officers by an act 
of Congress, we do not, therefore, consider it our duty to counsel the 
city officers . . . , to aid or assist in the arrest of fugitives from 
oppression.”125 Although more expressly rooted in Prigg, this promise 
was no stronger or weaker than the one the council had proposed weeks 
previous.  
In the end, these new resolutions appeared to be a compromise 
because the council had walked back their nullifying rhetoric and 
replaced it with handwringing about democratic legitimacy. This shift 
was directly responsive to Douglas’s concerns that rhetoric denying the 
force of the law altogether threatened secession and revolution—a 
rupture of the finely balanced political order. Simply decrying the law 
as dangerous and wrong was more consistent with the fraught détente 
upon which national politics rested in 1850. 
The reason for this conciliation may be revealed in the last portion 
of Dodge’s second resolution. Aiming to assuage some in the city who 
had been concerned about federal retaliation, the resolution proclaims 
that the city does “not believe that our harbor appropriations will be 
withheld, our railroads injured, or our commerce destroyed, or that 
treason could be committed against the Government.”126 
This last declaration is fascinating, especially in light of the political 
and legal struggles over sanctuary city status today in which questions 
of commandeering and withheld federal spending are front and center. 
 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at 85–86. 
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It is not clear from the record just how serious the threat to Chicago’s 
federal funding for harbors and railways was or was perceived to be. 
Still, the threat may have been present enough that, when combined 
with Douglas’s pressure, it gave some council members pause enough 
to justify the new, less inflammatory rhetoric.  
When we ask what the Chicago City Council could and should 
have done in the face of the Fugitive Slave Law, the answer comes down 
to the power and value of rhetoric. In both sets of resolutions, the 
Council forcefully denounced the law as both immoral and 
unconstitutional. The emotional register of this rejection was clear from 
the second resolution’s deeply personal objection that the law was “an 
outrage upon our feelings of justice and humanity.”127 From this cri de 
couer, as well as from the attack on Douglas and his allies as traitors and 
“judases” there is little doubt that the resolutions were motivated by a 
pressing desire to speak out and be heard resisting the law. Douglas was 
certainly among the intended audience. It is tempting to imagine that 
the black activists that had met just weeks before the resolutions were 
passed were also among the audience. After all, they explicitly 
complained that they could expect no help from the city or the people. 
One could imagine Throop’s resolutions as intended to answer that 
doubt with support.  
But while the Council clearly had the capacity to speak out and 
align themselves politically against Douglas and the Fugitive Slave Law, 
they did not feel (for reasons either pragmatic or structural) that they 
had the capacity to do more. Juxtaposed against the risks and sacrifices 
that the activists had committed to at the Quinn Temple meeting, we 
are forced to ask whether the Council’s resolutions were effective, and 
for whom. As was the case in Weymouth, there is a strong case to be 
made that speaking was better than staying silent. After all, Chicago was 
the only city of any significant size in the United States to take any sort 
of official stand against the enforcement of the law. Throop’s 
resolutions were a kind of bravery—and their political power was 
evident in Douglas’s response. On the other hand, the bravery of the 
resolutions was bravery within a national political discourse and not 
directly connected to the kind of bravery being shown by abolitionist 
activists who were patrolling the streets to protect against kidnappers. 
Even if Throop himself was in solidarity with those materially 
protecting the human beings threatened by the operation of the law, 
neither slate of the Council’s resolutions committed the official 
 
 127 Id. at 85. 
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resources of the city to that effort. If this limitation of the power of the 
resolutions is not a condemnation, it is at least an important context 
through which to understand the extent to which Chicago really did 
seek to resist or nullify. 
c.      Marshfield 
While some towns took up the question of the Fugitive Slave Law 
in specially called meetings in the last months of 1850, others waited to 
address their resolutions against the law until the regularly scheduled 
town meetings in the spring of 1851.128 Because it was Daniel Webster’s 
hometown, Marshfield, Massachusetts was one of the most prominent 
towns to take this course.  
Apart from Webster, Marshfield was an otherwise unremarkable 
town. Marshfield is located on the South Shore of Massachusetts, south 
and east of Weymouth and just a few miles north of Plymouth. In 1850, 
it was a medium sized town with a population of 1837, 16 of whom were 
listed as “free colored” on the census.129 It was and remains a place 
whose connection to the first Puritan settlers in Plymouth is strong. One 
can hear the echoes of Puritan moral rigor in the language of 
Marshfield’s strident resolutions. 
On March 3, 1851, 154 residents gathered at Marshfield’s annual 
town meeting. Of these, 120 voted to approve a set of resolutions 
condemning the Fugitive Slave Law, while 34 voted against.130 These 
resolutions were among the most strident and radical proposed by any 
town. They made a set of now familiar moves: condemning the law as 
unconstitutional and immoral, promising that the residents of 
Marshfield would not obey the law, and exhorting enslaved people and 
fugitive to resist bondage by any means necessary. Strident though its 
language was, Marshfield offered nothing more concrete than 
Weymouth or Chicago to alleged fugitives in the way of substantive 
protection. 
While the record does not indicate that the Marshfield resolutions 
had an individual advocate parallel to Richards or Throop, it is likely 
that they were introduced and advocated by a member of the town’s 
 
 128 Weymouth, of course, addressed the question both in the fall and the spring—voting to 
expunge its fall condemnations in the sober light of spring moderation. 
 129 See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF 1850: MASSACHUSETTS 52 (1850). 
 130 RICHARDS, supra note 6, at 163–64. 
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active abolitionist community.131 Unlike Weymouth, however, the 
resolutions in Marshfield were brought before the full town meeting 
and then approved by a resounding four to one margin. 
The preface to the resolutions began familiarly by arguing that the 
Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 was in violation of both the Constitution and 
public morality. It was anathema to “moral sense, a disgrace to the 
civilization of the age, and clearly at variance with the whole spirit of 
the Christian faith.”132 The constitutional argument explicitly linked the 
Declaration of Independence to the Constitution—arguing that human 
equality was at the root of the American legal system.133 Building from 
this foundation, Marshfield’s meeting declared that the Law was in 
violation of constitutional principles set out in the preamble to the 
Constitution,134 as well as the express protections of the Fifth, Sixth, and 
Seventh Amendments (the guarantee of due process and the right to a 
jury).135 
Like Chicago, Marshfield unified constitutional and moral 
arguments to create a justification for nullification. The Constitution, 
on the town’s view, could not support a law that stood in such stark 
 
 131 As early as 1834, Marshfield sent representatives to the New England Anti-Slavery 
Convention. Silas Ripley is listed as the delegate. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW-ENGLAND ANTI-
SLAVERY CONVENTION HELD IN BOSTON ON THE 27TH, 28TH AND 29TH OF MAY, 1834 4 (1834). 
 132 RICHARDS, supra note 6, at 163. 
 133 See id. (“Whereas the government of the United States is professedly based on the great 
truth that all men are free and equal . . . .”). By linking the Declaration of Independence with the 
Constitution, the framers of Marshfield’s resolution aligned themselves with a specific strain of 
anti-slavery legal argument which argued that the Constitution could and should be read as 
consistent with the broad principles outlined in the Declaration. Although this argument was 
widespread, a particularly clear instance of it appears in Lysander Spooner’s influential book 
outlining an anti-slavery interpretation of the Constitution. Spooner argued that the Declaration 
was essentially foundational or “constitutional” law in the United States, law that was 
incorporated rather than undone by the Constitution of 1787. See LYSANDER SPOONER, THE 
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY 42–45 (1853). By 1850, Southern proponents of slavery had 
repudiated the Declaration as a source of constitutional authority or law of any kind because of 
the danger to slavery they saw in the high-flying rhetoric of Jefferson’s promise that “all men are 
created equal.” This view was widespread among Southern political elites. Perhaps the most 
forceful expression of this view was offered by the pro-slavery theorist George Fitzhugh who 
argued that the Declaration was a dangerous and false document whose words were “at war with 
all government, all subordination, all order.” GEORGE FITZHUGH, SOCIOLOGY FOR THE SOUTH, 
OR THE FAILURE OF FREE SOCIETY 175 (1854). 
 134 RICHARDS, supra note 6, at 163(“[The U.S.] Constitution was ordained for the purpose of 
establishing Justice, ensuring domestic tranquility providng [sic] for the common defense, 
promoting the general welfare . . . .”). 
 135 See id. (“[The Constitution] declares that no man shall be deprived of life or liberty without 
due process of law, and that men charged with crime or whose interests are at stake in suits at 
common law involving a sum equal to twenty dollars, shall be entitled to a trial by Jury . . . .”). 
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opposition to justice. In the town’s eyes then, faith with the nation’s 
fundamental law mandated rather than prohibited the town from 
questioning the validity of a law passed by the national legislature: “until 
we are prepared to repudiate the principles of Independence, & abjure 
all our ideas of Justice and humanity, of truth & duty, we can be under 
no voluntary obedience to this act.”136 
Although the rhetoric of nullification in this sentence is explicit, it 
was less clear who was making the promise to nullify. The town as a 
governing entity, speaking through its official municipal voice, denied 
the force of a federal law and claimed to be bound instead by 
“principles” with more compulsive force than the federal legislature. 
And yet, the “we” of the resolution more likely referred to the town 
residents in their collective personal capacity rather than the town 
government itself. Just like Weymouth and Chicago, Marshfield’s 
resolutions pledged no affirmative assertion of town power to give force 
to the rhetoric of nullification. 
And yet, this was precisely the kind of nullifying rhetoric that had 
been so inflammatory in Weymouth and Chicago. Moderates in those 
places argued that refusing to acknowledge the legitimacy and security 
of Southern property claims would trigger a Southern backlash that 
would end in secession. Marshfield’s residents knew of these arguments 
because their own neighbor Webster was fond of making them.137 But 
they were unmoved by them (in fact it is likely that they were motivated 
by Webster to speak against them). Instead, they next resolved that, 
“while we love & defend the Union . . . we are not to be deterred by any 
threats of disunion.”138 No threat to the union or any other potential 
catastrophe would deter the townspeople from “using all just and lawful 
means to aid & assist those who have the manliness & courage to escape 
from their prison house of bondage.”139 
In this promise, Marshfield came as close as any town to offering 
substantive protection to fugitives within its borders. Marshfield as a 
town seemed to contemplate the consequences of its action and, 
weighing the costs, determined to follow its course. In the balance, the 
resolutions concluded that the political risk was worth the faith that the 
town was keeping with its core moral and legal principles which 
demanded disobedience to the law. And yet, despite the strident pose, 
 
 136 Id. (emphasis added). 
 137 Indeed, it is likely that some of the thirty-four residents who attended the meeting and 
voted against the resolutions made a version of these arguments. 
 138 RICHARDS, supra note 6, at 163. 
 139 Id. at 164. 
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nothing about Marshfield’s promise bound the town government to any 
action. Rather, the sanctuary that Marshfield offered was nothing more 
than collective private good will. The citizens of Marshfield declared 
that “our houses shall be open to welcome the hunted Fugitive as he 
passes our doors in his flight from the national bloodhounds.”140  
Just as Weymouth’s resolutions failed to add the coercive force of 
the state to its attack on the “enemies of the peace” who supported the 
law, Marshfield likewise declined to offer any of its available public 
muscle to its promise of open houses. Given this, for a fugitive slave 
seeking sanctuary or a Northern accomplice helping her, the town’s 
promise was no more or less protective than any other private citizen’s 
declaration that they would not turn them in. 
It may be that the Marshfield citizens understood the underlying 
frailty of their promise, because the last resolution turned from the 
town’s own actions to an exhortation that fugitives actively struggle for 
their own freedom. Drifting into an uncomfortably racialized 
paternalism, the last resolution recommended that every fugitive “use 
all the means which God will justify to protect his freedom.”141 If God 
could be understood to authorize the use of force in self-defense (and if 
slavery was a mortal sin), then this resolution seemed to countenance 
armed resistance in the face of enslavement. Indeed, the resolution 
twice recommends that fugitives adhere to Patrick Henry’s famous 
saying: “give me liberty or give me death.”142 
While the exhortation to violent resistance was striking, the 
exhortation to martyrdom that followed was more unsettling: 
[A]s his last sigh mingles with the common air, and goes out over 
the world, and up to heaven, a swift witness against the nation which 
so foully murders him, let him breathe it to the wind that murmurs 
by him, and bequeath as an inspiring influence to the panting 
fugitive he leaves behind him.143 
In isolation, one could read this last resolution as nothing more 
than a spasm of sentimentality. But in the context of white abolitionist 
rhetoric more broadly, the spectacle of a meeting of white Northerners 
imagining the noble deaths of heroic black fugitives raises familiar 
problems of race and exploitation. Over the course of the radical 
abolition movement in the middle of the nineteenth century, the 
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suffering of enslaved humans was both a political inspiration, but also 
a nearly titillating object of sentimental fascination.144 
Perhaps Marshfield’s town meeting really did hope to reach out to 
the “panting fugitives” that its resolutions imagined. More likely, 
however, Marshfield hoped to shout resistance in the ears of a more 
local audience including native son Webster and the pro-compromise 
moderates in Massachusetts. Righteous condemnation, coupled with 
the promise of nullification but unsupported by enforcement, was 
consistent with the rhetorical resistance that we saw in Chicago and 
Weymouth. Given the choice between silence and speech, there is little 
doubt that Marshfield’s choice was worthy of celebration. But it is no 
more clear in Marshfield than in the other towns whether the town had 
found a means of strategically and effectively advancing the broader 
political resistance movement against the Fugitive Slave Law. 
d.      Princeton, Southborough, and Blackstone 
Three other towns in central Massachusetts also passed resolutions 
condemning and espousing nullification of the Fugitive Slave Law in 
the six months after it was passed. I treat all three together and more 
briefly not because they are inherently less interesting, but rather 
because they follow familiar patterns and prompt familiar conclusions. 
Princeton is a town in Worcester County in central Massachusetts. 
In 1850, Princeton was a middling-size town of 1,318 residents, only 
eight of whom were black.145 Just a few towns east of Princeton, 
Southborough is also a small town in the general orbit of Worcester. In 
1850, Southborough’s demographics looked much the same as 
Princeton’s, except that instead of a small free black population, there 
were no black residents at all recorded among the 1,347 inhabitants of 
the town.146 Another twenty-five miles south and east of Southborough 
on the border with Rhode Island is the town of Blackstone. In 1850, 
Blackstone was a significantly larger town of 4,391 residents, eleven of 
 
 144 More has been written about the power of the imagery of the “suffering slave” to the growth 
and success of white abolitionist politics than I can responsibly gloss in a single footnote. For a 
classic summary of the power of this image, see generally, Elizabeth B. Clark, “The Sacred Rights 
of the Weak”: Pain, Sympathy, and the Culture of Individual Rights in Antebellum America, 82 J. 
AM. HIST. 463 (1995). 
 145 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF 1850: MASSACHUSETTS 52 (185). In 1850, many 
of the towns in Worcester County were roughly this size. While Worcester itself was 
comparatively large with more than 17,000 residents, the second biggest town in the county was 
Fitchburg with 5,120 residents, and most other towns ranged between 1,000 and 2,500 residents. 
Id. 
 146 Id. 
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whom were free black citizens.147 Blackstone was also a comparatively 
new town, having been carved out of the town of Mendon to its north 
in 1845.148 None of these three towns were remarkable as hotbeds of 
radical politics or social foment. Like nearly every town in 
Massachusetts, all three towns had abolitionist activists living there,149 
but all three towns had comparatively small (or non-existent) free black 
communities and very little evidence of prior activism.150 In short, there 
was nothing immediately apparent on the surface to explain why these 
three towns would pass some of the most strident condemnations of the 
Fugitive Slave Law in the State. 
i.      Princeton 
On November 25, 1850, the Princeton town meeting met in a 
specially scheduled official meeting to discuss the Fugitive Slave Law. 
The preamble to the resolutions passed at that meeting sounded two 
familiar notes: it called the Fugitive Slave Law unconstitutional (“a 
palpable violation of our Bills of Rights”) and immoral (“abhorrent to 
all the feelings of humanity, and in contravention of the express 
commands of God.”).151  
Princeton’s argument that the law was unconstitutional began as 
Marshfield’s had by linking the ideals of the Declaration of 
Independence with the “purposes” of the Constitution. Unsurprisingly, 
Princeton concluded that the Fugitive slave law was “contradictory” and 
“inconsistent with” that hybrid constitutional order.152 More 
specifically, Princeton’s resolutions joined a familiar argument that the 
Fugitive Slave Law violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process clause 
 
 147 Id. 
 148 Among the reasons for Blackstone becoming a separate town was the fact that the residents 
of “Blackstone Village” lived six miles south of the Mendon town meeting house, making it a 
hardship to attend town meetings. See DUANE HAMILTON HURD, HISTORY OF WORCESTER, 
MASSACHUSETTS 613–14 (1889). Mendon seems to have been among the many towns that did 
not take up the question of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 at all in their town meeting. See JOHN 
G. METCALF, ANNALS OF THE TOWN OF MENDON 610–15 (1880). The town meeting would 
convene to condemn the Kansas and Nebraska Acts in 1854. See id. at 622. 
 149 Princeton had an active chapter of the American Anti-Slavery Society at least as far back 
as 1837, as did Mendon (the town that would give birth to Blackstone in 1845). See PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE MASSACHUSETTS ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY, supra note 79, at xliv–xlv. 
 150 It seems that most towns in Worcester County had small free black populations. Some, 
such as Mendon (35 out of 1,265), had larger percentages than others. Id. 
 151 D.H. Gregory, Letter to The Editor, Another Noble Town Example, LIBERATOR (Boston, 
Mass.), Dec. 27, 1850, at 3, http://theliberatorfiles.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/The-
Liberator-1850-12-27-Page-3.png [https://perma.cc/9T2A-9Y5E]. 
 152 Id. 
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to a more novel argument that it violated the Fourth Amendment right 
to be free from unreasonable seizures: “[The law] takes away the right 
of the people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable 
seizures,—and deprives men of their liberty, without due process of 
law.”153 
The due process argument subtly served the function of asserting 
that the townspeople of Princeton shared common rights and duties of 
citizenship with fugitive slaves. As it had in other towns, this rhetorical 
move to cloak every human being in common constitutional rights 
helped to explain why the Fugitive Slave Law had anything to do with a 
predominantly white town in central Massachusetts. 
Having declared the law legally and morally bankrupt, Princeton 
resolved to nullify it and to “disregard and contemn the provisions of 
this law.”154 Like Marshfield’s would a few months later, Princeton’s 
residents promised to flaunt the law’s threatened penalties and to 
“tender to the panting fugitive the hospitalities of our dwellings.”155 
Generous as the offer was, it was no more substantive than Weymouth’s 
or Marshfield’s. Princeton was also unable or unwilling to engage the 
machinery of its own governmental powers to offer any more than a 
promise that its residents would act generously. In fact, the town 
seemed to acknowledge its own powerlessness in its final resolution. 
There, the town meeting exhorted the state government to do all 
possible “for the protection and defence [sic] of all our citizens whose 
rights may be assailed or endangered by this law.”156 This call 
encompassed the rights of free blacks threatened with kidnapping as 
well as the rights of white citizens who might be charged criminally for 
providing aid and comfort to fugitives. In brief, Princeton exhorted its 
state government to reinstate personal liberty laws in spite of the 
Court’s holding in Prigg and the obvious intent of the Fugitive Slave 
Law of 1850. It was, it seemed, the responsibility of the state to give 
something more than rhetorical teeth to nullification. 
ii.      Southborough 
A few months later, in January of 1851, Southborough convened a 
special town meeting to discuss the Fugitive Slave Law. On the 20th of 
January, that “legal town meeting” voted forty-nine to twenty-nine to 
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adopt a series of resolutions condemning the law and promising to 
nullify the law as far as possible within the town’s boundaries.  
Unique amongst the nullifying towns, Southborough’s resolutions 
focused primarily on resisting the portions of the Fugitive Slave Law 
that criminalized providing aid to alleged fugitives. Although 
Southborough had no permanent black residents, it does seem to have 
been an occasional waystation on the Underground Railroad.157 Perhaps 
that is one reason why the town’s meeting would be offended by a law 
“making it a penal and a criminal offence to assist a fellow-man to walk 
the earth and breath the air of freedom.”158  
The Southborough meeting proceeded to make an exhortation and 
then a promise. First, echoing the awkward paternalism of Marshfield, 
the resolutions held that because “liberty is the birthright of every man,” 
the town resolved that an enslaved person has a duty “to himself, and 
to posterity, and to God, to take and to defend his liberty.”159 To this 
exhortation, the town added a familiar promise to nullify the operation 
of the law. The town collectively promised “to help [the fugitive] and to 
maintain his freedom.”160 To that end, the citizens of Southborough 
promised “to do all we can to make the soil of Southborough truly 
free.”161 
In some ways, Southborough’s promise was the most substantively 
protective that any town had offered. Rather than specifying only that 
the town’s residents would open their homes, Southborough promised 
to make the town’s soil “truly free.” A robust pursuit of this promise 
might have included some of the muscular local regulation and 
enforcement that other towns had been reluctant to offer. Still, it does 
not seem that the residents of Southborough contemplated such a wide-
ranging or robust course of action. Not only is there no record of any 
subsequent local legislation in this vein, the final resolution suggested, 
like Princeton’s had, that the ultimate responsibility for this kind of 
nullification rested in the lap of the state legislature. The meeting 
concluded that the legislature was “under moral obligations” to “help 
 
 157 See Wilbur H. Siebert, The Underground Railroad in Massachusetts, 9 N.E.  Q. 447, 453 
(1936). To be clear, nothing about Southborough’s role in the underground railroad suggests that 
there was anything to distinguish the town from its neighboring towns, whose town meetings 
ultimately remained silent. 
 158 The Right Action, LIBERATOR (Boston, Mass.), Feb. 28, 1851, at 3, 
http://theliberatorfiles.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/The-Liberator-1851-02-28-Page-
3.png [https://perma.cc/G6YY-QRPX]. 
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the oppressed and rebuke the oppressor.”162 Should they fail in this duty, 
“they are unworthy of the name of men.”163 
iii.      Blackstone 
On April 7, 1851, at its regular spring meeting, Blackstone’s town 
meeting met and voted to approve a set of resolutions written by Daniel 
Hill, Moses Southwick, and Thomas Davis repudiating the Fugitive 
Slave Law.164 Although Hill, Southwick, and Davis were named as 
authors, there is little record of any of the three of them as activists more 
broadly beyond their role in the 1851 meeting. Blackstone’s resolutions 
followed a familiar script. They were strident in their condemnation of 
the law, yet weak on substantive protections. 
The first resolution began by aligning the Declaration of 
Independence to principles of patriotism and moral duty. Blackstone’s 
resolution argued that the principle that “all men are born free and 
equal” was more than “a sentiment, solemnly declared by our fathers, 
in defense of which they pledged ‘their lives, their fortunes, and their 
sacred honor.’”165 Rather, the town’s residents were bound by moral 
principle more than by law. Equality was “a self-evident truth, 
applicable to every age and to every race” and to deprive “the African” 
of the “God-given birthright” of freedom was possible only for those 
lost souls “who have sacrificed their convictions on the altar of ambition 
or self-interest.”166  
The second resolution built on this base by arguing that the real 
evil of the Fugitive Slave Law was not only its unconstitutionality,167 but 
that the law conscripted Northern whites into the machinery of slavery. 
What made it truly offensive was that it “attempt[ed] to transform us 
into slave catchers, requiring us to sacrifice the noblest feelings of our 
nature, which prompt us to aid the weak rather than the strong, and by 
no means to strengthen the arm of the oppressor.”168 Blackstone thus 
refused to be complicit in the regime created by the law, seeking to 
return its white citizens to the status quo ante, where they were under 
no obligation to collaborate with Southern slave owners. 
 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. 
 164 HURD, supra note 148, at 617. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. 
 167 See id. (“That the Fugitive Slave Law, recently enacted by Congress, is not only contrary to 
the fundamental principles of our government, . . . ”). 
 168 Id. at 617. 
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Blackstone’s focus on the way that the law conscripted Northerners 
into accomplices of the slave power is the most forthright statement of 
an idea which had been latent in many of the nullifying towns’ 
resolutions. The problem with the Fugitive Slave Law was not precisely 
that it was unjust to alleged fugitives. The problem was that it brought 
slavery home to Massachusetts. It was this personalization of 
oppression that had and would continue to trigger so many newly 
fervent outbursts of opposition. It was in response to seeing his 
hometown of Concord as complicit with the slave power that Henry 
David Thoreau would famously declare: “It is not an era of repose. We 
have used up all our inherited freedom. If we would save our lives, we 
must fight for them.”169 
Just as Blackstone’s resolutions were clear on why the Fugitive 
Slave Law was the town’s business, so too were they clear that nullifying 
the law was no act of disunion or rebellion. This was because to assert 
this would be to accept that “this Union cannot exist on the principles 
of Justice, Humanity and Righteousness (and therefore is not worth 
preserving).”170 Blackstone overtly rejected this premise.171 By 
implication, however, Blackstone’s resolutions suggested that were one 
to accept that the only terms of the Union were compromise with 
slavecatchers, then perhaps the radical abolitionists had the right of it 
and the Union was not worth preserving on such terms.172 
Given the radicalism and political clarity of the lead up, one might 
expect a forthright statement of nullification. And yet, while speaking 
the language of nullification, Blackstone’s resolutions promise no more 
official local action than any of the others that we have seen. Rather, like 
Marshfield and Chicago, the resolutions promise (without any threat of 
government enforcement) that the town residents would never “render[ 
] aid [to the slave owner] in returning [a slave] into bondage.”173  
The town’s felt powerlessness is again revealed by the final 
resolution which puts the onus on the state legislature to act. As with 
other towns, Blackstone closes by charging the state legislature to pass 
 
 169 HENRY DAVID THOREAU, Slavery in Massachusetts, in WALDEN AND OTHER WRITINGS 712 
(1992). 
 170 HURD, supra note 148, at 617. 
 171 Id. (“[This is] a declaration which we are unwilling to admit.”). 
 172 The classic statement of this Northern anti-slavery secessionism ran in bold text across the 
banner of William Lloyd Garrison’s The Liberator. The motto of that flagship paper of radical 
abolition was, “No Union with Slaveholders.” 
 173 HURD, supra note 148, at 617. This promise comes couched in a flowery package. The 
drafters profess that they abhor slavery so much that they would refuse to provide aid even had 
the fugitive in question “basely sold himself to Southern slave holders.” Id. 
FARBMAN.42.6.1 (Do Not Delete) 10/24/21  9:18 PM 
2152 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:6 
   
 
an act nullifying the Law and protecting fugitives and free black 
residents by preserving the right to habeas and guaranteeing a trial by 
jury.174 
iv.      Lessons 
The resolutions in Princeton, Southborough, and Blackstone all 
differed from each other slightly. Where Princeton focused on the 
Declaration, Southborough focused on the rights of Northerners to 
provide aid to the oppressed and Blackstone focused on the iniquity of 
conscripting Northerners into the machinery of slave rendition. Still, all 
three followed the same rough pattern that was evident in Weymouth, 
Chicago, and Marshfield. In all three towns strident condemnations of 
the law were paired with bold declarations that the law would be 
nullified. But in all three towns actual substantive protections for 
alleged fugitives were hard to find.  
In these nullifying towns and cities, the local governments seemed 
driven by a need to speak out against a law that they despised. Precisely 
what role this speech was to have in the broader movement against the 
Fugitive Slave Law and slavery was less clear. At least superficially, there 
was certainly an appeal to the most direct and proximate audience for 
statements of resistance: other white Northerners in neighboring towns 
and political elites. Simply by speaking, these towns transformed their 
neighbors’ silence into complicity. And yet, whatever service to the 
broader movement was achieved by these towns seems more accidental 
than strategic. If the towns’ resolutions sometimes made it into the 
papers, there was no evidence of a concerted organizing campaign to 
bring other towns along as there had been in 1774. Moreover, as these 
towns proclaimed their intention to nullify the laws, they offered no 
account of how that nullification would be affected. Without any robust 
promises of town aid or concrete provision of sanctuary, these places 
offered nothing to those who were resisting the law at risk of life and 
freedom beyond what the private networks of resistance were already 
providing.  
2.      Local Introspection 
While most towns that passed resolutions against the Fugitive 
Slave Law followed the model of brash nullification, at least two 
 
 174 See id. 
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Massachusetts towns took a different and more measured approach. 
Resolutions passed in Needham and Acton were no less critical of the 
law, but they sought to more carefully balance what the towns were able 
(or willing) to do with an awareness of the towns’ place in the 
architecture of the broader movement. In doing so, these towns 
modeled a different idea of what the purpose of these resolutions might 
be. 
a.      Needham 
On April 7, 1851, Needham’s town meeting took up the issue of 
the Fugitive Slave Law at the end of its annual spring town meeting. All 
of the issues laid out on the meeting warrant had been resolved, and yet 
the townspeople stayed late to consider and adopt a preamble and 
resolution disapproving of the law.175 Needham is a town in the western 
suburbs of Boston. In 1850, Needham looked similar to towns like 
Princeton and Southbury. It was an average-sized town of 1,944 
residents, only three of whom were listed on the census as free blacks.176 
There is little in Needham’s profile or history to suggest that it was a 
particular hotbed of anti-slavery sentiment.177  
In the preamble, Needham’s resolution began in a familiar vein. 
The meeting proclaimed bluntly that the Fugitive Slave Law “is in direct 
violation of the Constitution of the United States.”178 Needham also 
echoed other towns’ specific arguments that the law was inconsistent 
with the principles of the Declaration of Independence as well as with 
the protections in the Constitution—specifically the right to a jury 
trial.179 Nor was the Needham meeting meek in their condemnation. 
The Fugitive Slave Law was a “flagrant Outrage on the rights, and 
liberties of the citizens of all the free States of the Union.”180 Moreover, 
echoing some of the towns that passed resolutions in the Revolutionary 
period condemning slavery, Needham suggested that the new law was a 
 
 175 See Proceedings of the Town Meeting of Needham, Massachusetts, in RECORDS OF THE 
TOWN OF NEEDHAM, MASSACHUSETTS (on file with the Town Clerk of Needham, 
Massachusetts). 
 176 See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF 1850: MASSACHUSETTS 52 (1850). 
 177 In fact, while most of the towns that passed resolutions had active Anti-Slavery Societies, I 
have found no record of any chapter operating in Needham the earliest years between 1833 and 
1839. 
 178 Proceedings of the Town Meeting of Needham, supra note 175. Interestingly, and uniquely, 
Needham also argued that the law was in violation of the terms of the Massachusetts 
Constitution. See id. 
 179 See id. 
 180 Id. (emphasis in original). 
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betrayal of the heroes of American independence, trampling on the 
principles “which caused the Patriots of our town to shed their blood 
and sacrifice their lives on the field of Lexington.”181 
While Needham’s outrage was explicit, a careful reading also 
reveals that it was a carefully cabined outrage. The Fugitive Slave Law 
was an outrage on the rights of free citizens, not primarily because it 
helped enslave people, but because it violated political and civic rights 
guaranteed by the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. 
Morality and natural justice were mostly absent from the rhetoric. 
Rather, the Needham meeting emphasized that the law betrayed the 
sacred civic compact at the root of our national virtue. The implicit 
claim, then, called back to the eighteenth-century town meetings by 
asserting that towns had the authority and responsibility to speak out 
against impingements on citizens’ fundamental rights to self-
government. 
Needham’s careful focus on political opposition was cashed out in 
the single resolution that followed its preamble. The townspeople of 
Needham studiously avoided any promise or threat of nullification. 
Instead, they committed to “on all suitable occasions express our 
hostility to [the Fugitive Slave Law].”182 Lest a reader mistakenly 
construe this commitment to be a promise to nullify the law or harbor 
alleged fugitives, the resolution made it clear that these expressions of 
hostility would be strictly political. “[A]s citizens of a Republic, we feel 
called upon to use all constitutional and peaceable means in our power 
to cause its immediate and unconditional repeal.”183 
On the one hand, the carefully cabined political protest in 
Needham’s resolution seems dry and moderate compared to the more 
strident and exuberant language of nullifying towns like Marshfield. 
Needham’s residents made no promises to shelter fugitives. Indeed, by 
implication, they suggested that they would obey the terms of the law, 
protesting it only by “all constitutional and peaceable means in our 
power.” 
On the other hand, however, Needham’s almost exclusively white 
townspeople drafted a resolution that was refreshingly free of 
paternalistic exhortations that slaves free themselves and promises of 
protection without the backing of town enforcement. On this view, 
Needham’s resolution seemed a careful and studied reflection on what 
 
 181 Id. (capitalization in the original). 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. 
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the town of Needham was able and willing to do to further the residents’ 
agreed-upon disagreement with the law. The vision of the power, 
promise, and capacity of local government was much narrower in 
Needham—it was limited to peaceable political protest and ruled out 
nullification or revolution. And yet the resolution was designed to 
operate fully within that power. Moreover, the resolution promised 
something that the town might actually be able to deliver: a robust 
public forum for the private forces engaged in a powerful movement of 
political protest and resistance. 
b.      Acton  
Just a few days later, on April 11, 1851, the town meeting of Acton 
met and passed a set of resolutions vigorously opposing the Fugitive 
Slave Law of 1850. Acton is a small town in western Middlesex 
County—east of the towns in Worcester County, but west of Needham 
and Boston. In 1850, Acton was home to 1,605 residents, all of whom 
were white.184 Acton borders on its more famous neighbor, Concord, 
which was the home of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, 
Nathaniel Hawthorne, the Alcotts, and other luminaries of the 
American Renaissance. But where Thoreau’s neighbors in Concord 
remained silent on the Fugitive Slave Law,185 Acton spoke out. In 
speaking, however, Acton set forth the most thorough and thoughtful 
account of what a town was willing and able to do effectively to resist 
the law. 
Many elements of the Acton resolutions were familiar from other 
towns’ enactments. The resolutions condemned the Fugitive Slave Law 
as unconstitutional and inconsistent with the ideals expressed in the 
Declaration of Independence. They also promised that the residents of 
the town would provide aid to any fugitive who should come to their 
door. Moreover, Acton’s resolutions were rooted in a thorough and 
pointed political analysis that condemned the Fugitive Slave Law as a 
 
 184 See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF 1850: MASSACHUSETTS 52 (1850). 
 185 It is always more difficult to prove inaction than action, but a close examination of 
Concord’s town records reveals no reference to the Fugitive Slave Law at any town meeting 
between 1850 and 1854. Confirming this absence is the fact that Concord’s silence is actually 
famous. In Thoreau’s scorching 1854 speech, Slavery in Massachusetts, he begins by savagely 
mocking his neighbors for meeting to pass resolutions opposing the Kansas and Nebraska Acts 
in 1854, but for remaining meekly silent about the state’s complicity with the Fugitive Slave Law. 
Thoreau reports that it was not until 1854 that Concord would meekly condemn the Fugitive 
Slave Law as an ancillary addendum to the town’s concern over Kansas. Rejecting this meekness, 
Thoreau argues: “There is not one slave in Nebraska; there are perhaps a million slaves in 
Massachusetts.” Thoreau, supra note 169, at 697. 
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morally and politically corrupt “compromise and agreement between 
the advocates of chattel slavery and the monied interest.”186 Clear and 
condemnatory though they were, Acton’s resolutions advocated not for 
nullification, but rather for a very specific form of local resistance: civil 
disobedience and political protest. 
The preamble to the resolutions laid out the town’s case against the 
Fugitive Slave Law. Acton argued that it was passed “at the bidding of 
the slave holders and apparently for the promotion of slavery.”187 
Founded as it was in corrupt compromise, it was perhaps no surprise 
that Acton’s meeting concluded that the law was “manifestly iniquitous 
and unconstitutional.”188 Rooted in slavery, unconstitutional, and 
immoral, it would seem to follow that the law should be nullified and 
openly resisted. And yet Acton took a more complex approach. The 
preamble merely argued that the law’s hideousness “create[d] doubts in 
the minds of lovers of freedom as to their duty in sustaining said law.”189 
Acton’s resolutions, then, were the embodiments of those doubts. The 
wrongness of the law was destabilizing, and the town’s resolutions 
staked out the town’s role in the political life of its residents who had to 
live with that destabilization. 
More than any of the other towns, Acton’s resolutions 
demonstrated purposeful introspection about the proper role for the 
town in the struggle. In the preamble, the Acton meeting acknowledged 
the question that Stephen Douglas had challenged the Chicago City 
Council with: what right or duty did the town have to speak out against 
the law? In answer to this, the preamble put forward a clearly articulated 
theory of the expressive role that local government do and should play 
in national political debate. “[P]ublic opinion” the preamble argued, “is 
the expounder of all laws enacted by an Elective Government.”190 This 
meant that every citizen (and every town) had a “duty to express in [a] 
public manner” their views when a law is “as we believe, unjust and 
despotic.”191 
 
 186 TOWN OF ACTON, Resolutions at 1851 Acton Town Meeting in Response to Federal Fugitive 
Slave Act, in APRIL 11, 1851 TOWN MEETING RECORDS (1851), 
https://www.actonmemoriallibrary.org/civilwar/documents/acton_town_meeting/1851_
resolutions.html [https://perma.cc/MG85-942V]. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. 
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Thus framed, Acton made it clear that these resolutions were 
compelled by the political context. Neither the town’s citizens, nor the 
town itself (which was merely the collective expression of its citizens) 
had the luxury of remaining silent in the face of an “unjust and 
despotic” law. One primary reason for this was to keep faith with the 
promise and principles of the Revolution. The meeting declared that 
“[we] feel it to be a duty we owe to the memory of our Fathers that we 
owe to ourselves, to our descendants, to our Country and to our God, 
to record our solemn protest against said law.”192 Not only does this 
callback to the Revolution stake a claim to political legitimacy, but it 
also serves as an implicit reminder of the role that towns and town 
meetings had played in stoking the political fires that led to 
independence. Speaking out was thus, not only a right secured by 
independence, but a powerful tool of political organizing and resistance 
when employed effectively. 
But the invocation of Redcoats and Minutemen was not intended 
as a literal call to arms. Instead, in the second resolution, the town 
meeting expressly disavowed “advocating forcible resistance to our 
government or any of its despotic laws.”193 Rather than resistance or 
open nullification, Acton argued that there was still hope for change 
through the democratic process: “there is still power with the People at 
the ballot box to cause their rights to be respected and to effect repeal 
of all unjust and oppressive laws.”194 
This caution with respect to nullification should not be understood 
as a damper on the strength of Acton’s opposition to the law. Instead, it 
provides a lens through which to understand the force and purpose of 
that opposition. The third resolution listed the outrages of the law and 
condemned it as “an abomination without a parallel in the annals of our 
government.”195 Even worse, the abomination was a betrayal of 
Massachusetts’s values and the result of a corrupt compact “between the 
advocates of chattel slavery and the monied interest.”196 The force of 
 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. In this, Acton was echoing an abolitionist argument that condemned Northern 
economic elites who relied on Southern cotton and commerce for supporting and perpetuating 
the system of slavery. Charles Sumner famously called this “an unhallowed union—conspiracy 
let it be called . . . between the lords of the lash and the lords of the loom.” CHARLES SUMNER, 
Speech for Union Among Men of All Parties Against the Slave Power, and the Extension of 
Slavery, in a Mass Convention at Worcester, June 28, 1848, in CHARLES SUMNER, ORATIONS AND 
SPEECHES, VOL. 2 256–57 (1850). 
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tying the abomination of the law to the hated politics of Southern 
appeasement was, Acton hoped, to stimulate active political resistance 
to the status quo order of power in Washington, D.C. Rather than 
continue to compromise in the cowering fear for the survival of the 
union, voters should “unit[e] to sustain all measures which tend to 
advance the cause of human liberty and maintain our inalienable 
rights.”197  
This was the vision of political resistance that drove one of the 
outcomes that Acton’s meeting hoped would come from their 
resolutions. In the sixth resolution, the town warned that “a rigorous 
enforcement of this law” will not “stop[] all agitation on the subject of 
slavery” and thereby preserve the Union.198 Just the opposite, 
enforcement of the law would tend to awake agitation against the law 
and weaken the bonds of the union and hasten the oncoming of a civil 
war.199 In this, Acton’s resolutions actually agree in part with Lewis 
Cass, Daniel Webster, and Stephen Douglas. Nullification and outraged 
resistance do pose an existential threat to the union. The conclusion, 
however, is not to tighten the law’s grip and enforce it by any means. 
Rather, those who wish to save the union and keep the peace should 
“use all the means in our power for the repeal of this as we believe 
unwise and wicked law.”200 
Striking a balance between seeking the repeal of the law with “all 
the means in our power” and nullifying the law was no easy task. 
Acton’s resolutions made it crystal clear that Acton residents had no 
intention, in their private capacities, of refusing aid to a fugitive in their 
midst or becoming complicit in the evils of slavery by complying with 
the law. And yet this refusal to obey the law was not quite a rejection of 
the law’s power or legitimacy. Rather, the resolutions imagined a choice 
between compliance with the law and punishment for not complying. 
Given that choice, it “would be in opposition to all our cherished ideas 
of the Declaration of Independence, our Bill of Rights, and our moral 
duties as accountable beings” to refuse aid to a fugitive.201 Rather, the 
townspeople “would sooner suffer the pains and penalties that might be 
inflicted upon us [for protecting] that liberty which we believe to be of 
more value than gold.”202 
 
 197 Resolutions at Action, supra note 186. 
 198 Id. 
 199 See id. 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. 
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To put it succinctly, Acton’s middle ground between revolutionary 
nullification and silent compliance was one that they might well have 
heard about from their neighbor, Thoreau, just a few years earlier: civil 
disobedience. This promise of civil disobedience was both consistent 
with the political advocacy at the root of Acton’s resolutions and 
feasible within the boundaries of the town’s understanding of its 
powers. Identically to the nullifying towns, Acton’s resolutions offered 
a collective private promise that fugitives would be safe in their town. 
Also, identically, Acton offered no coercive municipal protection to 
back that promise. What was different was that Acton recognized its 
limitations203 and staked out a role for the town in support of the kind 
of collective private action that the meeting approved of. Should 
residents provide aid to fugitives and not be caught, excellent. Should 
they be caught, prosecuted, and imprisoned, so much the better. In the 
words of Thoreau, “[u]nder a government which imprisons any 
unjustly, the true place for a just man is also a prison.”204 By implication, 
any such punishment would not be private or isolated. Instead, Acton’s 
resolutions promise that anyone enduring such a punishment would 
have the support of their neighbors and fellow townspeople. 
Indeed, the connections between Acton’s resolution and Thoreau 
go deeper. Thoreau famously argued, “that if one thousand, if one 
hundred, if ten men whom I could name—if ten honest men only,—aye, 
if one HONEST man, in this State of Massachusetts, ceasing to hold 
slaves, were actually to withdraw from this copartnership, and be locked 
up in the county jail therefor, it would be the abolition of slavery in 
America.”205 Acton’s resolutions and Thoreau share a common core 
logic: that there is a political “co-partnership” between Northern 
interests and Southern slave holders. This partnership is at the heart of 
the political order. Acton’s resolutions target this same corrupt 
compromise and pledge the town’s energies to the political struggle of 
 
 203 As I have argued above, Acton and the other towns almost certainly had more power to 
nullify the law than they came close to claiming. In this sense, the limitations of Acton’s power 
were self-imposed, pragmatic limitations rooted in what the town meeting was willing to do both 
as a matter of public will and movement strategy. 
 204 Henry David Thoreau, Resistance to Civil Government, in THE RADICAL READER: A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN RADICAL TRADITION 83 (2011). While any overt 
connection would be mere speculation, it bears noting that Thoreau’s original oration 
“Resistance to Civil Government” (which was later published as “Civil Disobedience”) was 
delivered at the Concord Lyceum in 1848. See id. at 79. Given the proximity between Acton and 
Concord, it is not hard to imagine that some in the Acton town meeting might have been familiar 
with and influenced by Thoreau’s essay. 
 205 Id. 
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untangling it. If that means that one, ten, or one hundred of Acton’s 
residents need go to prison, the town’s resolutions are aligned with 
Thoreau in the hope that doing so would be worth the cost. 
What makes Acton’s resolutions so striking is the degree to which 
they reflect a thoughtful local intervention in a complex social and 
political struggle. Acton’s resolutions neither pound the table nor do 
they temporize. Instead, they apply the same sharp radical edge to the 
strategic question of what a town can and should do in support of a 
resistance movement. Ultimately Acton’s resolutions offered no public 
protection to individual fugitives and accomplices. Nor did they 
promise to nullify or repeal the Fugitive Slave Law. Rather, Acton’s 
resolutions sought to create context, encouragement, and support for 
organizing against the corrupt political order that gave birth to the law. 
Through maintaining space and support for civil disobedience and 
organized political resistance within the boundaries of the 
constitutional order, Acton suggested that local governments can and 
must play a crucial role in that struggle. 
3.      Conclusions 
While these eight local governments were likely not the only ones 
to take official action against the law, they are a large enough sample to 
draw some conclusions from.206 Most of the places that passed 
resolutions framed them according to the pattern seen in Weymouth, 
Chicago, and Marshfield. They condemned the law as a violation of the 
Constitution and the townspeople’s civic and moral principles. They 
exhorted slaves and fugitives to struggle for their freedom and even give 
 
 206 The uncertainty of the sample springs from two sources. First, there are a few places where 
my research has uncovered what seems to be evidence of an official local resistance to the law 
that I have unable to confirm or expand upon. For example, it appears that the town council of 
Lancaster, Indiana passed a resolution opposing the law in 1852, but I have not been able to find 
further evidence it. See Richard Clough, Eleutheran College: A Sustainable Heritage, 
EARTHCHARTER INDIANA (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.earthcharterindiana.org/sustainable-
indiana-solutions/2017/1/7/eleutherian-college-a-sustainable-heritage [https://perma.cc/DF3Z-
NU6H] (indicating that there is a plaque in Lancaster commemorating the passage of this 
resolution by town council in 1852). Second, my experience researching these resolutions in the 
basements of Town Clerk’s offices leads me to believe that a thorough search of the archives of 
all 351 towns and cities in Massachusetts would yield at least one or two more examples. When 
you add the archives of all of the other towns in New England and all of the other towns and 
cities across the North, it is hard to imagine that there are not more resolutions out there to be 
discovered. As I argued above, however, there is reason to think that while there are a few 
examples that I have missed, there is not a hidden trove of them. 
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their lives for that struggle. They promised to resist the law and refused 
to enforce it. And yet these nullifying towns uniformly failed to offer 
any substantive protections either for alleged fugitives or for men and 
women accused of helping those fugitives.  
Except for Chicago, all of these local governments were towns in 
Massachusetts with comparatively few black residents. Their 
resolutions were often written by and advocated for by individual white 
anti-slavery activists who sought to use the bully pulpit of a town 
meeting resolution to advance the cause of abolitionism. When it came 
to the expressive role of local resistance, the towns maximized their 
voices, seemingly in the hopes of influencing other towns and political 
actors. But when it came to the substantive protection of the people 
subject to the enforcement of the hated law, the towns could offer only 
collective private promises of sanctuary (without any enforcement 
mechanism) and occasionally an exhortation to the state legislature to 
act where the town could not.  
These nullifying resolutions are characterized by this dissonance 
between rhetoric and performance. Compare, for example, the forceful 
pragmatic protections enacted by the organized black activists of the 
Quinn Chapel meeting in Chicago with the City Council’s subsequent 
thin promise not to cooperate with the federal authorities. The work of 
helping human beings escape slavery and preserve their freedom was 
hazardous and those who did it risked their lives and livelihoods. If any 
town or city had enlisted its public resources to aid in that work, it 
would indeed have amounted to an act of open rebellion—as Stephen 
Douglas phrased it: “rais[ing] the standard of rebellion and throw[ing] 
off the authority of the Federal Government.”207 But the fact that the 
consequences of such a rebellion might be dire, perhaps involving 
armed suppression from the federal authorities, does not mean that it 
would have been impossible for a town or a city to take those actions. 
Indeed, the nullifying towns seemed to promise precisely this level of 
commitment to the cause. If Weymouth could encourage every slave to 
escape, or if Marshfield could encourage every fugitive to defend her 
freedom with her life, why could they not match those stakes and risk 
their own liberties and safety? 
Ultimately more muscular overt resistance would likely have been 
counterproductive. Openly and notoriously shielding fugitive slaves 
would have been an excellent way to encourage the defenders of the law 
to crack down on any town offering public sanctuary. This calculus 
 
 207 Mann, supra note 10, at 75. 
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would change if enough cities and towns joined together in the strategy. 
But failing such a collective uprising, the critique of the disconnect 
between the nullifying towns rhetoric and substantive protections is not 
that they did too little, but rather that they promised too much. They 
seemed more interested in the rhetoric of their promises than in the 
protection of those who they professed to be concerned about.  
To state this in starker terms: too often the nullifying towns used 
the victims of the law as tools in a political struggle. This is what makes 
the resolutions in Needham and Acton stand out as different. These 
resolutions were no more substantively protective of the victims of the 
law, but they did not promise to do more than they could, nor did they 
resort to exploitation and exhortation to support their expressive goals. 
Acton’s clear and thorough condemnation of the Fugitive Slave Law, 
paired with a clear plan of political resistance rooted in advocacy and 
civil disobedience emerges as the most honest and the most strategically 
promising to our eyes today. 
But all of the foregoing presupposes that the goal of local resistance 
is consistency and respect for the victimized. A different set of questions 
arises if we ask which of these resolutions did the most to actually help 
fugitives? A still different set of questions emerges if we ask which of 
these resolutions did the most to actually help enslaved people and end 
slavery?  
As to the first question, it is extremely unlikely that any of these 
resolutions had a substantial impact on the migration patterns, 
freedom, or bondage of any actual fugitive slaves. What we do know 
about free black support networks across the North suggests that people 
fleeing slavery were likely to be drawn to cities and communities (like 
Chicago) where they had robust social networks and where there was a 
thriving free black community.208 In fact, there were some places where 
fugitives were virtually safe from apprehension not because of any 
official local government statement or action, but simply by virtue of 
such a strong and settled local opposition that the law was dead letter 
 
 208 For example, there were more than ten times as many free black residents in Cincinnati 
Ohio in 1850 than there were in Chicago. See JULIE WELCH, BETWEEN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM: 
FREE PEOPLE OF COLOR IN AMERICA FROM SETTLEMENT TO THE CIVIL WAR 85 (2014). Cincinnati 
had a large and active abolitionist community and a powerful network of black anti-slavery 
activists, but it was a city on the border between North and South whose local government would 
never have promised any modicum of official protection to fugitive slaves. Rather free blacks and 
fugitives in Cincinnati were protected by their organized social networks and by a cadre of 
vigilant and resourceful private actors. See NIKKI MARIE TAYLOR, FRONTIERS OF FREEDOM: 
CINCINNATI’S BLACK COMMUNITY, 1802–1868 138–60 (2005). 
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on the ground.209 Given this, any well-informed fugitive traveling the 
Underground Railroad would be much more likely to trace her steps to 
a place with a strong community and on-the-ground protections 
against recapture than she would be to seek out a town proclaiming 
itself safe. Furthermore, it would strain credulity to suggest that any 
enslaved person, upon reading or hearing of Weymouth’s resolution, 
would have been convinced by the town’s exhortation to escape. So too 
would it strain credulity to suggest that any fugitive, hearing 
Marshfield’s exhortation to defend their liberty to the death, would have 
changed their behavior in the face of recapture. 
As to the question of what role these resolutions had in the larger 
struggle against slavery, all we have is speculation. It is simply 
impossible to gauge whether the strident overreach of Marshfield’s 
chastisement of Webster was more politically effective than the 
reasoned political strategy of Acton. What is clear is that all of the local 
resolutions aspired to intervene against slavery, and it would be 
perverse to hold every act of resistance or attempt to make social change 
hostage to an empirical assessment of whether or not “it worked” under 
one or another definition. Rather, these questions and their uncertain 
answers affirm that these resolutions were not ultimately targeted at the 
pragmatic goal of protecting alleged fugitives from being returned to 
slavery. The resolutions are best understood instead as honest, if flawed, 
attempts to use the power and voice of local government to engage in 
the messy, entrenched, and intractable political struggle over slavery in 
the United States.  
C.      Other Local Responses 
Although the towns and cities that passed resolutions condemning 
the Fugitive Slave Law raise the most interesting questions for the past 
and the present, they represented a tiny minority of the local responses 
to the law in the first years after its passage. Most local governments 
followed Concord’s lead and simply remained silent. Some places took 
small or oblique actions signaling opposition to the law without openly 
repudiating it while other places expressed open support for the law. 
This range of responses is cast into relief by the places that did speak 
 
 209 For example, for the most part, the Fugitive Slave Law went unenforced in states like 
Michigan both because of private resistance and the sheer practical difficulty of tracking alleged 
fugitives that far away from the South. See Roy E. Finkenbine, A Beacon of Liberty on the Great 
Lakes, in THE HISTORY OF MICHIGAN LAW 91 (Paul Finkelman & Martin J. Hershock eds., 2006). 
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out. When Chicago passed resolutions opposing the law, it stripped 
other cities of the neutrality of silence. Once the option of nullification 
was on the table, not choosing that option had meaning. So too with 
towns in Massachusetts. Just as Weymouth’s repudiation of their 
November resolutions was not a return to neutrality but a tacit 
endorsement of the Fugitive Slave Law, so too were Marshfield, 
Princeton and Blackstone’s neighbors’ silence put into a new light when 
held up against those towns’ resolutions. 
Although I address each category of response only briefly here, 
each represents a contending view of what the power and possibility of 
local action in the face of federal law can be. Seeing the full spectrum, 
then, helps to articulate the complexity of the choices made by 
nullifying towns. 
1.      Tacit Opposition to the Fugitive Slave Law 
Although it is much harder to isolate clear examples, there were 
many places where local officials took actions that expressed sympathy 
with critiques of the Fugitive Slave Law without explicitly condemning 
the law. This kind of response was more common in larger cities, 
though it was also evident in smaller towns.  
It is no accident that nearly every example of official local 
resistance came from a town meeting rather than a town or city council. 
In a town meeting the functions of governance and collective expression 
are unified at one place and time. Town meetings, at least in theory, 
govern through collective expression. Thus, a town meeting is a more 
fertile forum for official expressions of outrage than a city or town run 
by a council and a mayor where collective expression is funneled 
through the prism of elected representatives. Beyond this, there is the 
more mundane point that larger cities are more politically diverse and 
thus less likely to converge on consensus around any kind of moral 
position. In more diverse political communities, it may be safer simply 
to avoid a contentious question if possible than to confront it.210 
 
 210 Here is a place where the distinction between resistance to the Fugitive Slave Law and 
present-day resistance to the deportation crisis is apparent. Many of the most prominent 
localities proclaiming themselves “sanctuaries” or “welcoming cities” are in fact larger cities. As 
I discuss in more detail in Part III, this is partly because of a change in how we think about 
political diversity that grows out of the United States increasingly balkanized and regional 
political culture. See infra Part III. 
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Perhaps for these reasons, it was more common in cities governed 
by the council/mayor model for the mayor or councilors to make direct 
or oblique political statements opposing the law without committing 
any specific resolution or policy to an official decree. A prime example 
is Worcester, Massachusetts. When the new mayor of Worcester, Peter 
C. Bacon, was inaugurated in April of 1851, he devoted part of his 
inaugural address to the Fugitive Slave Law. Without expressly 
condemning the law or advocating nullification, Mayor Bacon affirmed 
that the Worcester police would take no part in enforcing the law. 
Falling back on Prigg and echoing Chicago’s final resolution, he argued 
that “[t]he government of the Union is clothed with all necessary 
authority, and to them should be left the enforcement of this law.”211  
Another example was Syracuse, New York. On October 4, 1850, 
just weeks after the Fugitive Slave Law had been signed, a huge public 
meeting was called and convened in Syracuse City Hall to draft 
resolutions opposing the law. The meeting was not “official” and the 
resolutions that were passed were the resolutions of a gathering of 
private citizens rather than the official act of the city. Still, the man 
presiding over this mass meeting (and thus implicitly sanctioning its 
proceedings) was Mayor Albert Hovey.212 
Worcester and Syracuse were hardly alone. A close look at towns 
and cities across the North reveals a myriad of small measures taken to 
express opposition to the law. For example, the town meeting of Fall 
River, Massachusetts voted in April 1851 to instruct its state legislative 
delegation to support noted abolitionist and critic of the Fugitive Slave 
law Charles Sumner in his bid to become U.S. Senator.213 That same 
April, the town meeting in Plymouth, Massachusetts voted to instruct 
their state legislators to support a bill that would impede the operation 
of the law.214 Occasionally the expressions of disapproval were purely 
symbolic. In 1854, the town meeting of Waterville Maine, voted to ring 
the church bells in solidarity with the famous alleged fugitive Anthony 
Burns to mark the town’s disapproval that he had been marched back 
to slavery under federal military guard in Boston.215  
 
 211 HERBERT SAWYER, HISTORY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF POLICE SERVICE OF WORCESTER, 
MASSACHUSETTS 45 (1900). 
 212 See Letter to the Editor, Opposition to the Fugitive Slave Law, N.Y. TRIB., Oct. 9, 1850, at 2. 
 213 See A Sign, LIBERATOR (Boston, Mass.), Apr. 25, 1851, at 3. 
 214 See The Fugitive Slave Law in Plymouth, N.Y. EVENING MIRROR, Apr. 10, 1851, at 3. 
 215 See A CHRONOLOGY OF MUNICIPAL HISTORY AND ELECTION STATISTICS, WATERVILLE, 
MAINE, 177–1908 100 (1908). 
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In one sense, these many tacit disapprovals of the law were 
unavoidable outcomes in a Northern political culture where anti-
slavery was becoming an increasingly strong political force. In another 
sense, they highlight the fact that local opposition to the Fugitive Slave 
Law did not always manifest as an explicit act of local government 
repudiating the law. The mayor of Worcester, for example, addressed 
his opposition to the law purely in the context of a local question: would 
the city’s police help to enforce it. By and large, towns that took this 
approach seemed to see the fight over the Fugitive Slave Law as 
something taking place beyond their local borders. Where the law 
touched their local lives, they might respond. Where it did not, they left 
it alone. 
2.      Local Silence 
Most cities and towns never concluded that the law had touched 
their local concerns. The most common local government response to 
the Fugitive Slave Law was official silence. It is, of course, difficult to 
prove an absence. Still, my experience in town archives confirms that 
silence was the norm and not the exception. As discussed above, 
Concord’s silence on the law in 1850 and 1851 was conspicuous and 
made infamous by Thoreau.  
In addition to Concord, let me offer two more examples, simply by 
way of illustration. First, the town of Mendon, Massachusetts. Mendon 
was the town that Blackstone split off from in 1845. Thus, in 1850, the 
split between the two towns was relatively fresh. When Blackstone 
passed its resolutions in the spring of 1851, the people of Mendon were 
surely aware of it. And yet there is no record of Mendon’s town meeting 
making any mention of the Fugitive Slave Law during the relevant time 
period.216 Second, the town of Dedham. Dedham borders on Needham 
and had an active abolitionist community.217 Dedham was among the 
many towns whose records I checked, and I was able to find no mention 
of the Fugitive Slave Law in its town meeting. 
It is difficult to say too much about this silence beyond noting that 
while government silence is never neutral, silence where other local 
 
 216 See JOHN G. METCALF, ANNALS OF THE TOWN OF MENDON, FROM 1659–1880 (1880). 
 217 In the spring of 1851, Dedham was home to the annual meeting of the Norfolk County 
Anti-Slavery Society. That gathering passed a set of scorching resolutions (these meetings nearly 
always passed resolutions far more scorching than anything passed at any town meeting). See 
The Dedham Meeting, LIBERATOR (Boston, Mass.), May 2, 1851, at 70. 
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governments have chosen to speak can be read all the more clearly as a 
town or city’s affirmative decision to remain on the sidelines. In some 
instances, this decision could be driven by a sincere belief that the 
Fugitive Slave Law and the political struggle over slavery were simply 
not local issues. In other instances, this decision might be a product of 
local disagreement that made silence easier than a public battle over 
what kind of position the town or city might take.  
What makes the silent towns most interesting, however, is not 
what their silence says about them, but rather how their silence 
contrasts with the strident expression of the nullifying towns. Even 
where those towns tacitly agreed with their silent neighbors that there 
was little of substance they could do to intervene against slavery or to 
protect fugitives, they still acted to use their public voice to engage in 
the political struggle rather than abstain. This choice, between active 
engagement and abstention—and between a conception of “local 
interest” that includes national politics and one that does not, is 
vibrantly alive in the present. 
3.      Local Support for the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 
Finally, a small number of Northern towns took official actions 
that either tacitly or expressly supported the legitimacy and 
enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law.218 By 1850, these resolutions 
were seldom as forthrightly supportive of slavery as Brighton’s 1837 
resolution had been when it abjured “any interference tending to affect 
in the least degree the interests of the Slaveholding States.”219 Still, in a 
number of towns and cities, local politics and the exigencies of local 
events pressed local governments into affirmative actions supporting 
the law. 
Perhaps the most infamous of these was in Boston. In the first years 
after the Fugitive Slave Law was enacted, Boston was the scene of two 
famous escapes where alleged fugitives slipped out of the grasp of their 
putative owners and the process of the new law. The first of these 
escapes involved William and Ellen Craft in February of 1851.220 
President Fillmore, Webster, and the moderates who supported the 
 
 218 There were a number of Southern local governments that passed resolutions supporting 
and demanding support for the Fugitive Slave Law. 
 219 Preamble and Resolutions, Adopted at a Town Meeting of the Inhabitants of Brighton, supra 
note 57, at 123. 
 220 See BLACKETT, supra note 58, at 396–408 (a full account of the Crafts’ case and escape). 
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Fugitive Slave Law were furious that the escape had been allowed to 
happen and they put pressure on the city government to promise that it 
would not repeat itself. Under that pressure, the Board of Aldermen 
passed a resolution promising to offer the city’s assistance to any federal 
officer who fears that “there is a danger that he shall be unlawfully 
obstructed in the performance of his official duties by a mob.”221 
Although the Aldermen did not promise to enforce the law directly, this 
promise to support federal officers enforcing the law amounted to the 
same thing. 
It was under similar circumstances that the city government of 
Syracuse passed resolutions supporting the enforcement of the law 
there. In late 1851, an alleged fugitive named William Henry 
(commonly known as Jerry) was rescued by a group of anti-slavery 
activists from federal custody in Syracuse.222 In the wake of this rescue, 
the federal authorities again put pressure on the city government to 
promise that the law would be enforced in the future. Despite the fact 
that Syracuse’s previous mayor had openly supported an anti-slavery 
meeting in 1850, the new mayor and council succumbed to pressure and 
passed a set of resolutions promising to prevent future anti-slavery 
mobs.223 
In other cities, support for the Fugitive Slave Law was more covert. 
For example, in Springfield, Massachusetts, the city government voted 
in the spring of 1851 to close the town hall to speeches by abolitionists, 
protesting that they were too disruptive to the public peace.224 Because 
the anti-slavery movement was reliant on public speaking to win 
converts, a ban on abolitionist speech amounted to a tacit endorsement 
of the status quo and ongoing validity of the Fugitive Slave Law. 
These examples are more consistent with the local governments 
that tacitly opposed the law than they are with the nullifying towns. In 
all three of these cases, the cities acted in support of the law not because 
they sought to make an expressive political point, but rather because 
they were forced by local political circumstance to take a position. 
 
 221 The Following Ordinance was Passed by the Board of Aldermen on Tuesday Last, 
LIBERATOR (Boston, Mass.), Feb. 21, 1851, at 30. This ordinance did not prevent a second escape 
from occurring just days later. Shadrach Minkins escaped from the custody of the federal marshal 
at the hands of a mob of anti-slavery allies. See BLACKETT, supra note 58, at 409–10. Boston’s 
municipal support of the Fugitive Slave Law would become more overt, however, when the city 
assisted in the rendition of Thomas Sims in 1851 and Anthony Burns in 1854. 
 222 See BLACKETT, supra note 58, at 85–86. 
 223 See The Jerry Rescue Celebration, LIBERATOR (Boston, Mass.), Oct. 15, 1852, at 165. 
 224 See A Cowardly Manifesto, LIBERATOR (Boston, Mass.), Mar. 14, 1851, at 41. 
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When it was no longer possible to remain silent, and under pressure 
from supporters of the law and the South, these local governments put 
their thumb on the scale in support of the law. Their actions were not 
meant as catalysts to political action. Rather, they were minimalist 
gestures seemingly designed to move local government away from the 
national political question as quickly and quietly as possible. 
III.      THE SANCTUARY MOVEMENT AND THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW OF 
1850 
It should be clear by now that the stories of the towns and cities 
that resisted the Fugitive Slave Law cast overlapping shadows on 
questions that face towns and cities in the present. The chasm between 
past and present is wide, and any historian must be cautious when 
proposing to bridge that chasm by drawing explicit lessons from the 
past into the present.  
Still, I write these words in present gripped by political and moral 
crisis over immigration. In 2020, the United States removed an average 
of more than five hundred human beings a day across its borders,225 
many of them to conditions of poverty and imminent physical danger. 
Even now, months into the Biden administration hundreds of 
unaccompanied children are detained at the border every day,226 
although conditions have improved from the nadir of Trump’s family 
separation policy, many of these children remain isolated from their 
parents in shocking conditions.227 In 2019, the horrifying images and 
 
 225 See ICE Statistics, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (last updated May 12, 
2021), https://www.ice.gov/remove/statistics# [https://perma.cc/4D4J-34JT] (reporting that 
185,884 people were removed in 2020). This number is a marked decrease from previous years. 
ICE reported that more than 267,000 people were removed in 2019. See ERO FY 2019 
Achievements, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (last updated Feb. 10, 2021, 
https://www.ice.gov/features/ERO-2019 [https://perma.cc/2FSW-U24X]. 
 226 See Franco Ordonez, Hundreds of Migrant Children Held in Border Detention for More 
than 10 Days, NPR.ORG (Mar. 18, 2021, 10:19 PM), https://www.npr.org/2021/03/18/979014713/
hundreds-of-migrant-children-held-in-border-detention-for-more-than-10-days 
[https://perma.cc/5Q7K-WAF8]. 
 227 On the shocking conditions children faced in 2019, see Dara Lind, The Horrifying 
Conditions Facing Kids in Border Detention, Explained, VOX (June 25, 2019, 1:10 PM), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/6/25/18715725/children-border-detention-kids-
cages-immigration [https://perma.cc/N9HJ-JMAT]. On the long-term effects of the trauma those 
children experienced, see Laura C. N. Wood, Impact of Punitive Immigration Policies, Parent-
Child Separation and Child Detention on the Mental Health and Development of Children, BJM 
PAEDIATRICS OPEN, Sept. 26, 2018, at 1 (summarizing the “significant body of research 
demonstrating the extensive harm” of detaining children for immigration purposes). 
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stories coming from the border sparked protests fueled by moral 
outrage, demanding—often under the banner of “Never Again”—that 
the federal government “close the camps.”228 Nor is the crisis new. There 
are more than ten million undocumented immigrants living in the 
United States, nearly seven million of them have lived here for more 
than a decade.229 These people are long-term residents, living peaceful 
lives, paying taxes, and raising children who are American citizens. By 
labeling them “illegal” our federal deportation policy places them in a 
constant state of existential insecurity.230 The conditions of suffering 
and uncertainty facing undocumented people at and within our borders 
are the explicit product of federal laws and their enforcement. 
Moreover, they are situated within a culture of political crisis in which 
partisans are litigating fundamental disputes over the American project 
through their fights over immigration and the human beings subject to 
our immigration laws.   
My historical inquiry has emerged from within this years-long 
political crisis. Like every historian, I am bound to write history in and 
to the present. To the extent that the stories of local government 
resistance in the 1850s are interesting, it is because they help us see the 
present more clearly. Given this reality, and the present stakes, I feel 
bound to make an effort to trace the lines of connection between the 
1850s and today, despite the yawning chasm that divides them.231 
Having said this, this Article is not and cannot be a thorough 
investigation of the ways in which local governments are resisting 
 
 228 See Leila Ettachfini, The Jews Organizing Against ICE to Stop Concentration Camps, VICE 
(Aug. 20, 2019, 2:12 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/3kxqqw/the-jews-organizing-
against-ice-to-stop-concentration-camps [https://perma.cc/WU6E-HZLG]. 
 229 See Jens Manuel Krogstad, Jeffrey S. Passel, & D’Vera Cohn, 5 Facts About Illegal 
Immigration in the U.S., PEW RESEARCH CTR.: FACT TANK (June 12, 2019) 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/12/5-facts-about-illegal-immigration-in-the-u-
s [https://perma.cc/NV3K-EWDV]. 
 230 My colleague Dan Kanstroom refers to this looming threat of deportation as “post-entry 
social control” pointing out that the possibility of deportation impacts not only individual 
undocumented immigrants but their children, families, and extended social networks. See 
DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 5–8 (2007). 
Ethnographer Ines Hasselberg has more recently documented the daily stresses and sufferings of 
human beings subject to the threat of deportation in the United Kingdom and the United States. 
See INES HASSELBERG, ENDURING UNCERTAINTY: DEPORTATION, PUNISHMENT AND EVERYDAY 
LIFE (2016). 
 231 This is neither the first, nor the second time that I have risked an explicit investigation of 
the present implications of my historical research. See Farbman, supra note 59; Daniel Farbman, 
Reconstructing Local Government, 70 VAND. L. REV. 413, 482–83 (2017) (summarizing the 
professional perils of presentism and a defense of my obstinate practice of braving those perils). 
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federal immigration policy.232 Rather, among the many threads that I 
might trace into the present, I will discuss only three here in conclusion. 
First, observing the parallels between the political crises of 1850 and the 
present is a powerful reminder that the local actions in the past, like 
those in the present, are the products of a messy, contingent, and 
uncertain political struggle. Those struggling against laws that they 
despise, however flawed or complex that struggle, are usually doing 
nothing more than the best they can within a morally complex political 
morass. Second, having acknowledged how difficult it is to assess the 
virtues and vices of strategies for social change, it remains true that this 
history should serve to bolster the arguments of those who are 
concerned that the rhetoric of sanctuary as increasingly employed by 
local governments may not provide as much protection for the people 
under threat of deportation as the proclamations suggest. Third, and 
finally, I argue that despite these concerns, the history suggests ways 
that local governments can productively engage in the political struggle 
over deportations while balancing a broad social change agenda with a 
specific set of commitments and supports for the people threatened 
with deportation. 
A.      Intractable Political Struggle Past and Present 
There is a temptation to idealize and rarify the struggle against 
slavery. The cataclysmic cruelty of the American system of plantation 
slavery cannot be understated, nor can the extent of the wounds that 
slavery has inflicted and continues to inflict on American political 
life.233 There is no question that those who struggled against slavery 
were frequently moral heroes. And yet our tendency to flatten the story 
of slavery into crisply defined categories of “good” and “evil” actually 
 
 232 I am happy to say that this work is already vibrantly engaged by a number of thoughtful 
scholars. See, e.g., Rose Cuison Villazor & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, The New Sanctuary and 
Anti-Sanctuary Movements, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 549 (2018); Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Rick Su, 
& Rose Cuison Villazor, Essay, Anti-Sanctuary and Immigration Localism, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 
837 (2019); Nestor M. Davidson, Essay, The Dilemma of Localism in an Era of Polarization, 128 
YALE L.J. 954 (2019); Toni M. Massaro & Shefali Milczarek-Desai, Constitutional Cities: 
Sanctuary Jurisdictions, Local Voice, and Individual Liberty, 50 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 
(2018). 
 233 The New York Times’ explosive 1619 Project is just the most recent project seeking to 
document this lingering legacy. Despite the politicized pushback on that project, it is hard to 
imagine anyone seriously arguing that the legacy of slavery has not shaped the reality of American 
life and politics in the present. 
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minimizes the moral heroism of the abolitionists who fought against 
slavery.  
The struggle against slavery was, in its own time, a political struggle 
that took place between deeply conflicted political actors struggling to 
balance seemingly incommensurable political and moral imperatives on 
the playing field of conventional politics. The specifics of the positions 
and debates in the past are nearly impossible to recreate—moreover, it 
is pointless and unedifying to try decide which side of any given debate 
would align with any present political position.234 All of this is to say I 
have no interest in defending the proposition that the struggle to end 
slavery was “like” the struggle against deportation either in its details or 
magnitude.235 But even if the specifics of the struggle against slavery are 
not parallel to the present, the reverberating echoes across time can 
change the way we understand both the past and the present. 
Anyone paying attention to the political culture of the United 
States today knows what a crisis of political morality feels like. We know 
how the complex ways in which individual moral and civic struggles are 
embedded within a political system. We know how issues like 
immigration and abortion, precisely because of their moral vapor trails, 
are weaponized in our partisan electoral politics. We know how that 
same partisan electoral process helps to explain the competing shouts 
of state and local actors eager to situate themselves politically and 
advance their substantive goals. We also know how political and moral 
 
 234 Here I gesture with a dispirited sigh at the vapid and pyrrhic debate over whether it was 
“Republicans” or “Democrats” that opposed slavery. Even asking the question reveals a failure to 
engage thoughtfully with the complexities of the past. See Dinesh D’Souza, The Secret History of 
the Democratic Party, FOX NEWS (July 26, 2016), https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/dinesh-
dsouza-the-secret-history-of-the-democratic-party [https://perma.cc/YY2D-83QQ]; Michael 
Tomasky, Betraying Their Name: The Republican Party was Founded to Fight White Supremacy. 
Here’s How It’s Embraced It Now, THE DAILY BEAST (July 21, 2019, 8:41 AM), https://
www.thedailybeast.com/the-republican-party-was-founded-to-fight-white-supremacy-heres-
how-its-embraced-it-now [https://perma.cc/Q52X-8GQ3]. 
 235 It is tempting to catalog the ways in which undocumented immigrants seem to stand in a 
parallel position to fugitive slaves: human beings who are seeking “life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness” subject to the constant threat that the federal government will tear them from their 
homes and send them to an undesirable and possibly perilous new life. Without discounting the 
salience of these parallels entirely, it is more distracting than helpful to defend the details of these 
comparisons too closely. Chattel slavery and claims of ownership are categorically different from 
national borders and assertions of national belonging. Being exiled to slavery is different from 
being exiled to another country. Federal complicity in the property system of slavery is different 
from federal exclusion on the basis of national identity. I could keep going. Litigating each of 
these differences tends to diminish the one and most salient point of comparison: both regimes 
are artifacts of federal law that control the freedom and movement of entire categories of human 
beings. 
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argument pulse urgently but inconsistently through all of these complex 
structures.  
We know, in short, what it feels like to be suspended between 
political paralysis and the urgency of escaping that paralysis. We know 
too, or at least some of us do, what it feels like to face down what appears 
to be an existential threat to our political system and our fundamental 
civic values. Knowing all of these things, I propose, helps us to better 
recognize the experience of those who struggled in similar conditions 
in the 1850s.  
I am hesitant to catalogue everything that we might take away from 
recognizing echoes of our present crisis in the past.236 What these echoes 
do most concretely here is contextualize the actions taken by local 
governments in reaction to the Fugitive Slave Law—and thus sharpen 
the shadows they cast on the present. When Weymouth passed its 
November resolutions and then expunged them the next March, the 
battle between Elias Richards and his moderate neighbors was a small 
skirmish in a much broader political struggle. Richards, like most 
abolitionists, saw himself as the hero of the story that he would become 
in the light of history. But opponents saw themselves as heroes as well. 
They were aligned with Webster and Douglas preserving the union and 
averting the cataclysm of the Civil War. As I have already argued, the 
contested moral and pragmatic claims at work in Weymouth make the 
resolutions more heroic in a sense because they stake out a contested 
position rather than simply asserting the “right” against a clearly evil 
opponent. 
Recognizing the past as “normal” political struggle should also 
encourage us both to lower our expectations and be charitable when we 
assess these local resolutions. When the small town of Ipswich, 
Massachusetts voted in 2017 to declare itself a sanctuary, no one today 
could credibly believe that this act on its own has anything more than a 
 
 236 One tendentious example, among many, is that these echoes offer fodder for those who 
argue that our political system is irrevocably broken and that we stand on the brink of cataclysmic 
(or transformational) change. See, e.g., Ganesh Sitaraman, Divided We Fall, THE NEW REPUBLIC 
(Apr. 10, 2017), https://newrepublic.com/article/141644/divided-fall-trump-symptom-
constitutional-crisis-inequality [https://perma.cc/9AVD-MWBY]; Robert Reich, A Second 
American Civil War?, THE AM. PROSPECT (June 5, 2018), https://prospect.org/article/second-
american-civil-war [https://perma.cc/EH86-WMBR]. Of course, it is true that Americans living 
in the 1850s worried about the cataclysm of the Civil War but did not know that it was coming 
until it came. So too do many in the present worry about impending doom, and so too might we 
not see it until it comes. Still, this kind of results-oriented speculation runs against the spirit of 
the comparison for me. I am less interested in what doom we may face than I am in the dynamics 
of the political struggle that we are stuck in. 
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peripheral impact on either the broader political struggle or even on the 
experience of undocumented people in the United States.237 Rather, we 
understand that such a vote is largely symbolic, situated within a 
complex network of political struggle. In turn, we assess the impact and 
promise of such acts in their proper context.238 Is it better for Ipswich 
to take this symbolic position or not? What good might it do? And for 
whom?  
By the same token, recognizing the political struggles of the 1850s 
in the present also raises the stakes for these questions. Small and 
peripheral as these local acts might be, all acts in a political struggle have 
the potential to shape the course of that struggle. And so, while we 
should read the past generously, we should not absolve any local 
government acts of resistance from critique simply because their 
“intentions were good.” Rather, we should understand these acts of 
resistance for what they are, small but not insignificant skirmishes in a 
moral and political struggle. No matter how small the skirmish, it can 
be prosecuted more or less strategically. 
B.      Rhetoric and Substance in “Sanctuary” Cities 
Since 1774 and before, local actors in the United States have 
enacted their belief that local resistance could play a substantive role in 
broader political struggles. The proliferation in the last few decades of 
local enactments declaring towns and cities “sanctuaries,” “inclusive,” 
“welcoming,” or otherwise staking a claim in support of undocumented 
immigrants is proof that this belief remains firmly rooted in many 
corners of our civic life.239 The modern sanctuary movement borrowed 
terminology from a faith-based movement in the 1980s in which 
religious activists offered the sanctuary of their places of worship to 
 
 237 In 2017, Ipswich’s town meeting voted to pass the Ipswich Trust Act and declare itself a 
“Sanctuary Town.” See Linda Greenstein, Ipswich Votes to Become a Sanctuary Town, BOS. GLOBE 
(June 9, 2017, 12:30 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/06/06/ipswich-votes-
become-sanctuary-town/qhFdO990JhiGwUM0wYFWOJ/story.html [https://perma.cc/WAJ6-
2HKT]. 
 238 Ipswich town selectman Edward Rauscher admitted as much arguing in support of the act. 
“It is my duty as a US citizen to send a message, no matter how small, in support of the 
Constitution that is the bedrock of our country.” Id. 
 239 See Christopher N. Lasch, R. Linus Chan, Ingrid V. Eagly, Dina Francesca Haynes, Annie 
Lai, Elizabeth M. McCormick & Juliet P. Stumpf, Understanding “Sanctuary Cities,” 59 B.C. L. 
REV. 1703, 1710 (2018). 
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Central Americans fleeing violence that the Reagan administration 
refused to offer asylum to.240  
Since the early years of the 21st century, local governments began 
using the term sanctuary to label the ordinances they were passing 
promising to protect undocumented people in their borders by refusing 
to cooperate with federal enforcement of immigration laws.241 After the 
election of President Trump in 2016 and his increased focus on 
immigration enforcement, many more towns and cities took up and 
passed local measures adopting versions of this label as gestures of 
resistance to the President and his policies.242 
On the one hand, these towns and cities have found many more 
substantive tools at hand to offer substantive protection to 
undocumented immigrants. Large and powerful though ICE and the 
FBI may be, the extent of the enforcement task posed by ten million 
undocumented immigrants is such that federal authorities must rely on 
local law enforcement to cooperate in the enforcement project. Thus, 
where towns and cities pass ordinances refusing their cooperation in a 
myriad of ways, those places are doing more than any of their 
counterparts in the 1850s to offer substantive protection to their 
residents.243 
Acknowledging the substantive tools at local governments’ 
disposal, these sanctuary policies are almost universally promises not to 
collaborate with federal immigration enforcement rather than promises 
to affirmatively protect undocumented people from such enforcement. 
In other words, towns and cities have committed not to turn their 
residents over to ICE, but they have not promised to place their police 
 
 240 See id. at 1709. 
 241 See id. at 1710. 
 242 See id. at 1708. Even in cities that had already declared themselves sanctuaries, it was 
common for mayors and police chiefs to speak out to promise that they would do their utmost 
to protect their undocumented residents. See Alex Kotlowitz, The Limits of Sanctuary Cities, THE 
NEW YORKER (Nov. 23, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-limits-of-
sanctuary-cities [https://perma.cc/DVJ6-F49R] (quoting Chicago mayor Rahm Emanuel: “To all 
those who are, after Tuesday’s election, very nervous and filled with anxiety, you are safe in 
Chicago.”). 
 243 A full examination of sanctuary policies and strategies is far beyond the scope of this 
Article. Once again, Christopher Lasch and his co-authors have offered the most thorough 
summary of the landscape breaking down the strategies into five broad categories: barring 
investigation of civil and criminal immigration violations, limiting compliance with immigration 
detainers and administrative warrants, refusing ICE access to jails, limiting disclosure of sensitive 
information, and precluding participation in joint operations with federal immigration 
enforcement. See Lasch et al., supra note 239, at 1736–52. 
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officers between their residents and ICE officers.244 Thus it is that nearly 
everyone writing about sanctuary—especially since 2016—is eager to 
remind us that undocumented immigrants are not safe from the grasp 
of ICE, even in a city that has declared itself a sanctuary.245 
Simply noting that sanctuary cities cannot fully protect 
undocumented residents from deportation need not vitiate the value of 
the protections they do offer. Thoughtful movement activists have 
sometimes used the movement for sanctuary as a tool to advance a 
broad range of political goals with the ultimate target of protecting the 
safety and livelihood of undocumented people.246 Moreover, even 
promises not to cooperate with federal enforcement are likely more 
protective than silence or affirmative collaboration with federal 
enforcers. Indeed, even if there were no substantive protections on 
offer, there could well be an expressive value in a town or city speaking 
out against deportation and standing in solidarity with its citizens.247 
But this is where the lessons of history may begin to impose themselves. 
 
 244 Although not passed by explicit ordinance, there are examples of local officials taking 
actions that are more openly protective in this vein. The most famous is Oakland, California 
mayor Libby Schaaf who in February of 2018 posted a message on Twitter tipping off Oakland 
residents that she had heard that ICE had planned a raid in her city in the next 24 hours. See Amy 
Held, Oakland Mayor Stands by ‘Fair Warning’ of Impending ICE Operation, NPR: THE TWO 
WAY (Mar. 1, 2018, 5:36 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/03/01/
589948064/oakland-mayor-stands-by-fair-warning-of-impending-ice-operation 
[https://perma.cc/WJV2-GBCD]. Schaaf’s warning was made in her official role as mayor, but it 
was not the official policy of Oakland that the city or its officials should interfere with ICE in this 
way. So too with other prominent examples of overt resistance. For example, when New York 
judges and police agreed to send criminal defendants to jail on Rikers Island rather than release 
them on bond to protect them from deportation, they were not following any explicit policy of 
the city. See Sonja Sharp, The Lawyers Trying to Get Their Clients Sent to Jail, VICE (July 4, 2017, 
12:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/qvppn7/the-lawyers-trying-to-get-their-clients-
sent-to-jail [https://perma.cc/LP4F-NGRR]. 
 245 See, e.g., Daniel Denvir, The False Promise of Sanctuary Cities, SLATE (Feb. 17, 2017, 2:39 
PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/02/the-false-promise-of-sanctuary-cities.html 
(arguing that the only way to truly protect undocumented immigrants would be for cities to 
“arrest[ ] and prosecut[e] fewer people.”) [https://perma.cc/EJM8-44ZM]. 
 246 The national organizing coalition Mijente has catalyzed this view of sanctuary as a 
centerpiece for a holistic protective vision under the label, “Expanding Sanctuary.” In the eyes of 
advocates and organizers using sanctuary as a political tool, the goal is to use local advocacy for 
sanctuary policies “to resist, town by town, city by city, county by county, connecting the shared 
fate of black and brown communities, acting from our most precious values, and sparking action 
to build power and make a meaningful difference in local communities.” Karina Muñiz-Pagán, 
Expanding Sanctuary, REIMAGINE!, https://www.reimaginerpe.org/22/muniz [https://perma.cc/
9TRJ-9L9E]. 
 247 See Massaro & Milczarek-Desai, supra note 232, at 72–80 (arguing that cities have First 
Amendment rights to political expression). 
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In a town or a city that promises sanctuary but cannot deliver it, the fact 
that its declaration is purely symbolic could be problematic as a matter 
of political strategy.  
When the nullifying towns proclaimed the Fugitive Slave Law dead 
letter and encouraged fugitives to resist recapture with their lives, they 
promised more than was in their capacity to deliver. So too, when Rahm 
Emanuel promised after the 2016 election that undocumented 
immigrants “are safe in Chicago,” it was more than just bluster, it 
represented a damaging misunderstanding (or misrepresentation) of 
the city’s capacity and willingness to protect the very people he was 
reassuring. This is more than speculation. In the first six months after 
President Trump took office, 2,725 people were deported from 
Chicago.248 
When towns and cities pass largely symbolic sanctuary ordinances 
without considering the movement strategies around those ordinances 
carefully, they are operating under the same theory of local resistance 
that the nullifying towns were. The reason for a symbolic ordinance like 
those recently passed in Los Angeles and Cincinnati is not to offer more 
substantive protection to undocumented people. Rather it is to stake an 
expressive claim in a political struggle.249 Where the town or city’s 
motivation is expression—and where that expression is not rooted in 
solidarity with immigrant rights movement actors—there is a danger 
that such expression will make use of a rhetoric of substantive 
protection or nullification and thereby inadvertently exploit the victims 
of the target policy in service of a political project that they may not 
share.  
This danger has stalked the sanctuary movement and has become 
increasingly public since 2016. Activists and journalists in cities like 
Philadelphia, Chicago, Boston, and New York have argued that 
immigrants are not safe in those cities—not only because the sanctuary 
policies are not fully protective, but often because some public 
 
 248 See Chuck Goudie & Christine Tressel, Spike in Chicago immigration arrests, deportations, 
ABC7 NEWS (Aug. 9, 2017), https://abc7chicago.com/spike-in-chicago-immigration-arrests-
deportations/2290817 [https://perma.cc/9U3Z-4SV5]. 
 249 See James Leggate, City council declares Cincinnati a ‘sanctuary city’, WCPO 9 NEWS (Feb. 
1, 2017) https://www.wcpo.com/news/local-news/hamilton-county/cincinnati/city-council-
declares-cincinnati-a-sanctuary-city [https://perma.cc/G7NF-9Y5W] (experts argue that the 
label is “mostly symbolic” because the city had already agreed not to cooperate with federal 
authorities); Dakota Smith & Matthew Ormseth, It took a while, but L.A. formally declares itself 
a ‘city of sanctuary,’ L.A. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-
city-of-sanctuary-cedillo-20190208-story.html [https://perma.cc/LT9Z-PEA2]. 
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employees have quietly collaborated with immigration enforcement.250 
Some commentators have built on these concerns, arguing that the 
rhetoric of sanctuary is harmful, either because it is misleading and 
polarizing,251 or because it assuages the consciences of white liberals 
without offering substantive protections to people of color.252 
Without indicting any specific town or city policy, the history of 
local resistance in the 1850s suggests that these concerns are worth 
taking seriously. Local governments need not (and perhaps cannot) 
offer true sanctuary to their residents. But where the real purposes of 
local action are expressive and not protective, it is incumbent on 
thoughtful local actors to carefully consider for whom that expression 
is being undertaken and what place the town or city has within the 
broader political movement for immigrants’ rights. 
C.      Towns and Cities in Political Struggle 
The question lingers, how can local governments productively 
stand against laws that they believe should not be enforced? Or to state 
this in a thicker political context: how can local governments be 
productive sites for resistance movements? If towns and cities cannot 
or will not order their police to stand between a fugitive slave and a 
federal marshal, or to stand between an undocumented immigrant and 
an ICE officer, should they remain silent? The answer to this question, 
following the lines of connection between history and the present is: 
clearly not.  
Towns and cities are more than their police powers or their 
expressive voices. They are rich and complex public fora where human 
beings struggle together in the messy and daily work of sharing space, 
power, resources, and government. As such, local governments are 
places where resistance movements can be given space, voice, and 
 
 250 See David Gambacorta, Even in Philadelphia, One of the Most Determined Sanctuary Cities, 
Refuge is Elusive, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.propublica.org/article/even-in-
philadelphia-one-of-the-most-determined-sanctuary-cities-refuge-is-elusive [https://perma.cc/
9W3N-54MW]; Liz Robbins, In a ‘Sanctuary City,’ Immigrants are Still at Risk, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/27/nyregion/sanctuary-cities-immigrants-ice.html 
[https://perma.cc/EV9G-FQ7E]. 
 251 See Michael Kagan, What We Talk About When We Talk About Sanctuary Cities, 52 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 391 (2018). 
 252 See Christina Bolden, I live in a sanctuary city, and it’s a safe haven for white liberal anti-
Blackness, BLACK YOUTH PROJECT (Oct. 6, 2017), http://blackyouthproject.com/sanctuary-city-
safe-haven-white-liberal-anti-blackness [https://perma.cc/9YBF-Y6VQ]. 
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power (or, in the alternative, places that can be closed off to those 
movements.) It would be a mistake to conclude from the critiques of 
symbolic sanctuary policies that the best response for local governments 
is simply to retreat from the field and leave matters to private actors. 
The model for resistance in the present is not Concord’s silent retreat 
and deferral, but rather Acton’s measured public resistance.  
Remember that Acton’s town meeting in 1851 grounded the town’s 
resolutions in a carefully stated expressive mandate: it was the town’s 
duty to speak out against “unjust and despotic law[s].”253 Acton made 
no promise to nullify the Fugitive Slave Law, rather the resolutions 
exposed the law’s constitutional and moral infirmities and committed 
the town to use “all the means in our power” to repeal it.254 To this 
public commitment to advocacy against the law, Acton added a promise 
to stand in solidarity with those who engaged in civil disobedience and 
refused to obey the law. 
What makes Acton’s model appealing is that it balances the 
exigency that local governments feel to stand up and speak out in 
resistance against an honest assessment of local capacity. A growing 
number of scholars and advocates have begun to recognize that any 
movement for true sanctuary in the United States must rely on 
collective private action in concert with public protections.255 If real 
protection requires more than public action, then local governments are 
obliged not to proclaim themselves protectors, but rather to create space 
for collaboration and solidarity.  
Another way of saying this is that if local governments want to be 
productive participants in a mass movement for change as part of a 
political and moral struggle, they would do well to articulate and 
understand their role within that struggle. Strident rhetoric and 
condemnation have power, especially when issued from the bully pulpit 
of a democratically accountable local government. That power is 
greatest, however, when it reinforces and magnifies the other voices in 
a political struggle.256 The truth is that in nearly every place where 
 
 253 See APRIL 11, 1851 TOWN MEETING RECORDS, supra note 186. 
 254 Id. 
 255 Rose Cuizon Villazor & Pratheepan Gulasekaram have called this “Sanctuary Everywhere” 
arguing that hand in glove partnerships between state, local, and private actors have proliferated 
since 2016. See Cuizon Villazor & Gulasekaram, supra note 232, at 553–60. 
 256 There is a vibrant literature advocating that local governments (and especially cities) 
should seek to become fertile gathering places for social movements and social transformation. 
In some cases, theorists have argued that movement actors should take the reins of the local 
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undocumented people are living, there are active and organized 
movements to protect those people from being exiled from their homes 
and to ensure them as robust a participation in the public life of their 
homes as possible. Sometimes these local actors have prioritized and 
aggressively advanced demands for sanctuary policies from local 
governments,257 in many other instances, formal sanctuary policies are 
simply not priorities for these organized communities.258 Whatever a 
local government’s formal position on sanctuary, every local 
jurisdiction has tools at its disposal to provide space and resources to 
undocumented people and those in their community who are working 
to protect them.259 Towns and cities that accept the limitations of their 
 
government. See, e.g., DAVID HARVEY, REBEL CITIES: FROM THE RIGHT TO THE CITY TO THE 
URBAN REVOLUTION (2012). This set of arguments has been the source of inspiration for a 
growing “municipalist” movement where social movement actors were elected and sought to 
remake local governance as a procedural and substantive forum for grassroots discussion and 
change. The most famous (and evangelical) example of this is Barcelona’s Barcelona en Comu 
movement. See Why Do We Want to Win Back Barcelona?, GUANYEM BARCELONA, 
https://guanyembarcelona.cat/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/priciples.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L3N3-9V5X]. At its root, however, municipalism is built on a proposal that 
local government can and should provide a forum for movement—and indeed that it is the people 
and private movement actors within that forum whose struggle will be transformative. 
 257 See COLBERN & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 21, at 314–15 (noting concerted efforts by 
local movement activists such as NDLON in Los Angeles advancing sanctuary policies). 
 258 It is, as ever, hard to prove a negative, but a few examples may be illustrative. One is Make 
the Road, New York, a leading community organizing group in New York City with a strong 
focus on protecting undocumented residents of the city. The group makes no mention of 
sanctuary as part of its advocacy on its web page. See Immigration, MAKE THE ROAD NEW YORK, 
https://maketheroadny.org/issue/immigration [https://perma.cc/FY2Y-V39E]. Similarly, the 
Puente Movement, based in Tucson, is a powerful and radical organization protecting 
undocumented people in Arizona. However, sanctuary and sanctuary policy is nowhere to be 
found on their webpage either. See Puente Movement for Migrant Justice, PUENTE.AZ, 
https://puenteaz.org [https://perma.cc/97J7-7TWL]. As a matter of anecdotal observation, 
sanctuary and sanctuary policies are not central to the work of many organizers who are 
struggling to protect and empower people “on the ground.” 
 259 Once again, it is beyond the scope of this project to catalogue all of the ways that local 
governments can provide space and resources. In place of a comprehensive list, then, a brief 
catalogue: Local governments can help directly fund the work of activists and organizers, see Els 
De Graauw, Shannon Gleeson, & Irene Bloemraad, Funding Immigrant Organizations, Suburban 
Free-Riding and Local Civic Presence, 119 AM. J. OF SOCIO. 75 (2013) (arguing that funding for 
immigrant organizations is not equitably distributed, but noting generous streams of funding 
from local governments in cities like San Jose and San Francisco). Local governments can provide 
their own services, and perhaps most dramatically, they can provide lawyers to residents who are 
in detention facing removal. See, e.g., Zoe Sullivan, The Cities Funding Legal Defense for 
Immigrants, NEXT CITY (May 21, 2019), https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/the-cities-funding-legal-
defense-for-immigrants [https://perma.cc/GS3V-VUGR]. Local governments can explicitly 
make public spaces such as courthouses or public schools into resources for immigrant 
 
FARBMAN.42.6.1  (Do Not Delete) 10/24/21  9:18 PM 
2021] AN OUTRAGE UPON OUR FEELINGS 2181 
   
 
capacity to protect can make use of their role as public fora to expand 
the capacity for the community more broadly to build power. In this 
model (drawn abstractly from Acton), local governments act not as the 
primary resisters themselves, but as conduits for nurturing and 
magnifying the role of resistance movements. To return this to the 
terms of this historical narrative, local governments make space for the 
vigilant patrols and direct protective work outlined in the Quinn Chapel 
meeting without claiming credit for that work or, worse, falsely 
promising protection without delivering it. 
In the end, neither strident nullification ordinances in 1850 nor 
strident sanctuary resolutions in 2021 fully protect the lives and well-
being of the humans for whom they are drafted and passed. When they 
imagine the civic space of local politics narrowly, towns and cities speak 
but do not strategize. But as narrow as these interventions can be when 
they are spasms of reactive politics, they can also be part of a rich and 
integrated approach that opens up local civic space for movements and 
activists to build the kinds of thick, cross-institutional networks aimed 
at long-term change. Stated this way, this sounds complex, but the 
model of Acton shows that it need not be. The lesson from Acton’s story 
for the present, stated in its simplest form is this: local governments can 
stand in solidarity with resistance movements when they humbly and 
honestly leverage their capacities and resources into strategic solidarity 
with existing movement actors. 
Despite the concerns about the present raised by concerns in the 
past, I find myself drawing optimism from the stories of local resistance 
against the Fugitive Slave Law. Even where local actors promised more 
than they could deliver, even when resolutions seemed to serve the 
drafters more than they served the victims of the law, there was moral 
bravery in the simple act of harnessing the machinery of local voice for 
the cause of anti-slavery. Moreover, when they were formulated 
thoughtfully, as in Acton, these resolutions confirmed that local action 
could be an integral part of a political struggle. In our present 
overlapping crises, towns and cities can take these past resolutions as 
inspirations, cautions, and models as they work to define their roles in 
the struggle before them. 
 
communities. Most broadly, local and state governments can open up basic features of civic life—
including even the right to vote—to undocumented immigrants in their communities. See Kimia 
Pakdaman, Spring 2019 Journal, Non-Citizen Voting Rights in the United States, BERKELEY PUB. 
POL’Y J. (Mar. 4, 2019), https://bppj.berkeley.edu/2019/03/04/spring-2019-journal-noncitizen-
voting-rights-in-the-united-states [https://perma.cc/X597-8XFW]. 
